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ABSTRACT
Sendero Luminoso first appeared in Peru in May 1980 by burning several ballot boxes
and hanging dogs from streetlights. This unusual event signaled the beginning of one of the
most violent insurgencies in the Western hemisphere. Abimael Guzmán, the founder of Sendero
Luminoso, set out to utterly destroy Peruvian society in order to replace it with his vision of a
utopian communist society by creating a peasant uprising starting in the Andean highlands and
spreading throughout Peru, eventually surrounding the capital, Lima.
The government of Peru virtually ignored Sendero Luminoso for two years, which
allowed the group to establish strong base areas in and around the department of Ayacucho.
When the government finally reacted, it was forced to declare a state of emergency in the south
central highlands and send in the military to regain control.
Through successive administrations over the next decade, Peru was engulfed in violence
and destruction, human rights abuses, corruption, and economic catastrophe. Sendero Luminoso
demonstrated an uncanny ability to avoid the military’s concentrated efforts while expanding
into new regions of Peru. The group also benefited from the drug trade to finance the insurgency
by providing protection to coca farmers and narcotraffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley.
Only after Guzmán’s capture in 1992 did the government witness visible progress in the
fight against the insurgents. Sendero Luminoso rapidly declined without Guzmán’s leadership
and the remnants withdrew to the Upper Huallaga Valley. Yet many of the conditions that led to
the creation of Sendero Luminoso still plague the country, including corruption in the
government, poverty, and a weak economy. The missing catalyst is another leader like Abimael
Guzmán.

iv

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, was one of the most successful insurgent groups in
the Western Hemisphere in the late 20th century. What is most remarkable about the group’s
expansion was that it occurred at a time when most Marxist-based institutions were collapsing.
Equally remarkable was its popularity, given its philosophy of creating a utopian society through
the violent destruction of all societal institutions. The group managed to mobilize the Andean
peasants with promises of a better life. Successive administration failures also contributed to
Sendero’s resiliency.
According to current U.S. Army doctrine, there are three basic prerequisites to the
emergence of an insurgency: (1) a vulnerable population that hopes for change, (2) leadership,
and (3) lack of government control. 1 All of these conditions existed in Peru and enabled Sendero
Luminoso to make headway. For long-term endurance, an insurgency must be able to create
popular support and maintain unity of effort. Sendero Luminoso certainly demonstrated a will to
resist, as witnessed by the fact that, despite aggressive counterguerrilla operations, it survives to
this day. Sendero had effective leadership, it was disciplined, and it developed a highly effective
intelligence network as well as a propaganda machine. Its reach extended throughout Peru and it
eventually established networks in other countries, including the United States.
An insurgency, of course, must have a favorable environment. Approximately the size of
Alaska, Peru is a struggling nation of 22 million people, with a great disparity in the standards of
living and distribution of wealth. The country is divided into three major regions: the Costa,
Sierra, and Montaña. The Costa, or coastal region, is the most developed and contains Peru’s
five largest cities, including Lima, as well as the bulk of the nation’s industries and its most
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extensive agricultural areas. The majority of the business and landowners in the Costa are of
Spanish origin, middle-class, and consider themselves white. This region offers the greater
opportunity for employment and advancement; however, historically jobs have gone to those of
Spanish descent, marginalizing the people from the Sierra and Montaña regions. The Sierra is a
mountainous region covering roughly a quarter of the territory and half the population of Peru.
Peruvian Indians, who trace their roots to the Incans, inhabit this area and live at poverty levels.
They speak primarily Quechua, which further alienates them from the Spanish-speaking people
of the Costa region. This area has little arable land and what land is under cultivation is stony
and windswept. The only trafficable roads wind along the valley floors and are little more than
dirt trails; there are no main roads from the coast.2 Due to the prohibitive mountain terrain and
lack of access, the Sierra region historically received little government attention. The Montaña
region consists of the Amazon River basin and takes up two-thirds of the land of Peru, but is
sparsely populated, mostly by tribal Indians. Many believe this region contains rich oil reserves,
but remains undeveloped because of the lack of access to the dense jungle. The poor economic
conditions, especially in the Sierra region, favored insurgency.
Insurgencies develop through several phases. 3 In Phase I, the insurgency is latent and
incipient. Its organizers conduct selected acts of terrorism, such as attacks on police forces,
assassination of local government officials, and sabotage infrastructure. They may also conduct
discreet tactical operations to increase influence in the area and, perhaps more importantly, to
acquire arms and ammunition.
Phase II is guerrilla warfare. As the insurgent group gains strength and numbers, it
openly challenges the local police and small military units in order to establish control over areas
of the country. The insurgents then set up their own government over these areas to demonstrate
2
3
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to the populace that they alone can provide the services the State failed to provide. The goal of
this phase is to expand control over other areas and people, in order to mobilize additional
support through public service and propaganda. If this fails to generate support, however, the
insurgents will resort to coercion and terrorism. The nature of the guerrilla actions and terrorist
strikes against the military often provoke an equally violent reaction, or overreaction, from the
government forces. The guerrilla acts in the hope that the military will overreact against the
general population, causing larger numbers of people to support the insurgency. Each guerrilla
success, no matter how minor, followed up with effective propaganda, provides psychological
support to the insurgency and demoralizes the government forces. As the government dedicates
greater effort to the military aspects of counterguerrilla operations, fewer resources are available
for development projects, which hinder its ability to reverse the conditions that caused the
insurgency.
Phase III insurgency, also called a war of movement, is conventional warfare.
This phase occurs when larger insurgent units conduct combat operations against government
forces to capture and retain key objectives. Sendero Luminoso only briefly achieved phase three.
Although it engaged in large-unit attacks on government forces, it never was able to retain its
objectives for more than twenty-four hours and never was able to sustain the momentum to
continue to fight determined government forces.
What are the strengths and weaknesses of guerrilla forces? One of the strengths typically
is intelligence collection. Virtually every person is a potential spy or informer for the insurgents
in their areas of operation. Another asset is the fact that the rebels are native to the region. They
therefore know the traditions and speak the language of the local populace, making them very
hard to distinguish from the average citizen. This characteristic becomes even more important
during foreign interventions in support of a government. Motivation and discipline are other
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strengths. Guerrilla tactics are another advantage because of the ease of planning and execution
and difficulty in preventing. Elusiveness, surprise, and brief violent action characterize such
tactics, which can be further divided into terrorism and harassment. Some examples of terrorism
include bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, threats, mutilations, murder, torture, or
blackmail. Insurgents generally use terrorism for coercion, provocation, and intimidation.
Examples of harassment include ambushes, raids, and other small-scale attacks dispersed in
geography and time which give the perception that the guerrilla can strike anywhere. Finally,
physical conditioning is an asset and was so especially in the case of Sendero, which operated in
the Sierra, an environment that imposed enormous physical hardships on government troops.
Insurgent movements also have several weaknesses, the primary being limited personnel
and resources. Numerically small at first, a guerrilla band must rely on early tactical successes,
supplemented by intense propaganda, to attract recruits. The insurgents must also balance the
need to recruit new members against security concerns of being penetrated by government
agents. Guerrilla forces typically start out with few weapons and little access to money and must
acquire additional resources through operations or contributions from the local populace or even
foreign governments. The insurgents are also limited in their ability to reach mass segments of
the population, especially in areas without modern infrastructure and internet access.
Sendero Luminoso exploited the poor economic conditions to convince the most
negatively affected and vulnerable population, the Indian population of the Sierra, to pick up
arms and fight against the government. Sendero leaders patiently recruited these people by
capitalizing on government neglect while providing hope of a better life. The group progressed
through the phases of development and started with simple acts of protest, such as painting
slogans on government structures, escalated to terrorism, and eventually resorted to large scale
military assaults. Due to the isolation of the Sierra, the government ignored the growing
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insurgency and allowed it to expand to the Costa region, which eventually necessitated a
comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign.
Counterinsurgency describes the full range of measures used by a government to protect
its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 4 It comprises the actions taken by a
nation to promote growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and
social) that respond to the needs of the people and has three targets: the population, the
insurgents, and external actors. The government of Peru initiated a limited counterinsurgency
campaign beginning in 1983, focused mainly on the military aspects or counterguerrilla
operations. Although the focus was on military operations against the insurgents, it also enacted
various political, economic and social changes.
Essentially, the State must take various actions to change the conditions that fuel the
insurgency. Most importantly, the government must focus on improving the lives of the
population. It may also use diplomacy – negotiation with the insurgents. State-sponsored
amnesty programs are an example of this. The government may resort to restrictions on civil
liberties in order to deny the insurgents the freedom to operate. While this method is the most
effective, it can also have adverse consequences and undermine the legitimacy of the current
administration. The more restrictions the State can impose without causing more people to rebel,
the quicker it can defeat the insurgency. The regime may also target and destroy the insurgent
leadership. This technique is effective in a leader-centric organization, but usually only in the
short-term as new leaders step forward to fill the vacuum created by the loss. Finally,
counterguerrilla operations focus on the active military element of the insurgent movement only.
Counterguerrilla operations, such as those launched by the Peruvian military in 1983-84, are a
supporting component of counterinsurgency.

4
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In order to restore order, the government must target insurgents. It must isolate them
from the general population, both physically and psychologically, by employing a strategy based
on balanced development, mobilization, and neutralization. The military contributes to this
effort by conducting six major operations: intelligence-gathering, psychological operations, civil
affairs, population and resources control, advisory assistance, and tactical or counterguerrilla
operations.
The commander plans counterguerrilla operations to exploit the guerrillas’ weaknesses
and prevent them from exploiting the government’s vulnerabilities. Interdiction of the
insurgents’ logistics support is one crucial task, but the commander must also protect his own
lines of communication and infrastructure, such as power stations and water treatment plants.
Finally, he sends out combat patrols to collect actionable intelligence, or information that leads
to operations that cripple the insurgent organization. Local paramilitary or militia often perform
many of these tasks and, along with the police, are chiefly responsible for community defense.
These organizations emphasize physical security and securing the lines of communication. The
Peruvian government employed such groups, who were known as Rondas Campesinos.
Sendero Luminoso is a self-described Maoist organization that professes to advance the
principles Mao Zedong introduced in China. According to Mao, during any revolution, guerrilla
operations offer the greatest likelihood of success in an underdeveloped nation. Sendero adopted
this tenet by continuously forwarding the call to the “People’s War” and focusing on armed
strikes. A guerrilla force must have powerful political leaders who “work unceasingly to bring
about internal unification. Such leaders must work with the people.” 5 The insurgents must
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balance operations against the enemy with actions supporting the people. Sendero typically
rejected or attacked all who did not adhere to Guzmán’s interpretation of Mao.
Mao also stated that the guerrillas must be sympathetic to the needs of the masses. They
derive their existence and support from the people and must attempt to meet the needs of the
people or the insurgency will fail. The insurgent leaders must be well trained, self-confident,
able to establish severe discipline, and able to cope with counter-propaganda. These leaders
must be role models for the people.
The rebel force must develop a bond with the community. This takes place by first
arousing the people through propaganda and unifying them through political indoctrination. This
bond allows the insurgents to establish bases, or geographic areas that openly support the
insurgency. Within the base areas, the leaders then begin to arm the guerrillas. Over time, the
guerrilla force obtains more sophisticated weapons within the base area by defeating the
government forces, which in turn allows it to expand this base. Through this cycle of base
expansion and bonding with the communities, the rebels are able to gain strength throughout the
nation as the government forces’ strength declines. This rebel-communal bond also allows the
insurgents to regain territory lost to the State during the course of the struggle.
Mao provided several ‘rules’ and ‘remarks’ that outlined guerrilla behavior toward the
local populace. These guidelines delineated the means of establishing and maintaining bonds
with the local communities. The Viet Cong adhered to Mao’s rules and enjoyed great early
acceptance and support among the people of Vietnam and serve as an example for Sendero to
follow. Mao’s three rules were:
1. All actions subject to command. This means that each individual, cell, or detachment
must act in accordance with orders of the guerrilla commander and ultimately, the
party leadership.

8
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust. 6
Mao placed great importance on being proper ‘guests’ of the locals when occupying their
homes and villages to rest, feed, and heal the guerrilla army. He also advocated the following 8
instructions to ensure the guerrilla was a proper guest:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Rollup bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not search those you arrest without authority. 7
Sendero initially lived by these principles and this made it extremely popular with the
local population. However, as the government forces moved into territory formerly controlled
by the insurgents and began to gain support, Sendero resorted more to coercion and terror to
maintain control.
Unlike Sendero, Mao openly recruited and accepted former enemies into his guerrilla
force, believing they provided valuable intelligence. Similarly to Sendero, he believed that any
new member must undergo political training and indoctrination prior to participation in any
operations. Only by making sure that new individuals were truly committed, could they be
trusted. This principle made government penetration of Sendero almost impossible.

6
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Mao believed that unorganized guerrilla warfare cannot contribute to victory and
those who attack the enemy using a combination of banditry and anarchism do not understand
the nature of guerrilla action. Guerrillas are to exterminate small forces of the enemy, to harass
and weaken large units, and to attack enemy lines of communication, all to compel the enemy to
disperse his strength. “We must make war everywhere and cause dispersal of his forces and
dissipation of his strength.” 8 During the progress of hostilities, guerrillas gradually develop into
conventional forces that operate in conjunction with other units of the guerrilla army. Mao’s
principles of guerrilla tactics can be summarized as follows:
-Enemy advances, we retreat
-Enemy halts, we harass
-Enemy tires, we attack
-Enemy retreats, we pursue. 9
By adhering to Mao’s philosophy of guerrilla warfare, Sendero Luminoso capitalized on
the existing environment and convinced the population of the Sierra to organize and revolt
against the government. These people were prime candidates to support this peasant-based
revolution as years of government neglect or half-measures elevated their frustration. Despite
the government’s success in quelling previous insurgent groups, the people of the central
highlands were desperate for change and willing to resort to violence to improve their future.

8
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CHAPTER 2 FORMATION (1968-1980)
Several factors contributed to the emergence of Sendero Luminoso, including dismal
economic conditions, marginally effective government, and people eager for change. Several
governments attempted to address these concerns throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The military
was at the forefront of these efforts when it took over control of Peru through a series of coups,
mainly to prevent what it perceived as middle-class elitist organizations from assuming power.
With the government experiencing such turbulence, Marxist-based organizations were able to
take root, both among the urban working class and rural peasantry. Several Marxist leaders
appeared during this time, but none more committed to violent overthrow than the leader of
Sendero Luminoso, Abimael Guzmán. He used the education system in the highlands to spread
his beliefs of the need for violent revolution and organized the peasants for war.

Latin America was a particularly turbulent region in the early 1960s. Many of the
countries were experiencing some form of political turmoil ranging from protests and strikes to
revolution. Most of the striking workers were aligned with Marxist groups or left-wing labor
unions, adding to fears of Communist revolution. This political turmoil, as well as economic
trouble, led to military coups in many Latin American countries in order to restore order or
prevent Communist takeovers. President Fernando Belaúnde Terry of the Popular Action Party
(PAP) struggled with those same problems in Peru in the 1960s. Economic problems imposed
extreme hardship on the peasants, most of who worked on large haciendas for low wages and
meager rations. As a result, unrest spread throughout the country, challenging Belaúnde and his
administration to maintain order. At the same time, insurgents from several Cuban-style foco
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guerrilla movements were attacking isolated military and police posts in the countryside. 1 By
1966, Belaúnde found himself forced to send in the military to crush the guerrilla movements
and contain the peasants, establishing a precedent of violent military action. 2
The Peruvian military had never been one to show restraint. Since 1914, the military had
demonstrated a willingness to intervene in political matters. 3 In 1962, military leaders took over
in a coup after the election of President Victor Raul Haya de la Torre of the American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), which they violently opposed, as a result of several clashes
with ‘Apristas’ dating back to 1930. That year, Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez Cerro had seized
power to preempt an APRA electoral victory and begun to crack down on the organization.
Apristas launched violent protests, killed twenty-six soldiers, and assassinated Cerro himself in
1933. The military retaliated by killing several thousand Apristas. 4 The military opposed
APRA’s populist ideology centered on the urban middle class. APRA wanted to mobilize and
empower the urban middle-class to create a State-directed capitalist economy. 5
The military once again intervened in 1968 due to President Belaúnde’s continued weak
leadership. Several other conditions led to the coup, including Haya de la Torre’s victory in the
national elections that year and the military’s vow to keep APRA out of power, as well as the
strong nationalistic sentiment in the military. Another key factor was Belaúnde’s settlement with

1
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the U.S.-owned International Petroleum Corporation (IPC).6 The settlement with the IPC in
August 1968, known as the Act of Talara, was a particularly unpopular decision. At a time of
growing national debt, rising inflation, and worsening unemployment, most Peruvians
considered this a sell-out to the Americans and added to growing ‘anti-Yankee’ sentiment. In
essence, the Belaúnde administration took control of several oil fields from the Americans and,
in return, dismissed a claim against the company for $144 million in “unjust profits.” The
decision led to a split in the PAP and guaranteed Belaúnde’s defeat in the national elections.
The military, which initially had supported Belaúnde and his economic reform measures,
grew increasingly disillusioned with the government and cabinet ministers. The more difficult
the issue, the more reluctant the administration was to make a decision or take the action
necessary to bring the economy under control. The military high command made plans to
intervene as early as 1966, using the recent coup in Argentina as a blueprint, but postponed
action. Prior to the election, APRA leaders had tried to gain military support by promising new
equipment purchases and expressing regret over past clashes, but Army leaders were unswayed.
The combination of Belaúnde’s weak leadership, the Act of Talara, belief that the cabinet
ministers were interested only in self-enrichment, the split in the PAP, and the probable APRA
victory in the impending elections led the military to act. 7 On October 3, 1968, a small group of
army officers conducted the actual take-over and then invited the navy and air force to
participate. The commanders of the three services formed a “Revolutionary Junta” and named
General Juan Velasco president. He formed a cabinet from the top-ranking officers and
surrounded himself with advisors made up of highly nationalistic army officers. One of his first
actions was the nationalization of the IPC, an extremely popular action in Peru but one that
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placed him at odds with the United States, which subsequently withdrew all aid. This led
Velasco to turn to the Soviet Bloc for support. 8
Velasco established diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries and they, in turn, began sending economic and military aid to Peru.
For example, from 1954-1968 Peru had received no funding from Communist countries. But in
1969, the Soviet Union sent $6 million in aid and in 1970 this increased to $28 million with an
additional $25 million from Eastern European countries. 9 This support from communist
countries disappointed some in the government, but Velsaco was able to remain in power by
capitalizing on anti-U.S. sentiment.
It is important to remember that the Peruvian armed forces, like those of most other Latin
American countries, see themselves as the arbiter of national politics and believe it is their duty
to intervene in the political process when internal stability is threatened. That attitude affected
civilian elected representatives and shaped all decision-making in the government. Politicians in
Peru to the present must always keep one eye on the military when taking action to ensure that it
meets with military approval.
Velasco and his military regime were active in support of the peasants. Since the mid
1950’s the military had been a leading voice in favor of reforms to avoid rural unrest. The
government now made several attempts at agrarian reform, promising to break up the holdings of
large landowners and distribute the land to the peasants. While the government did not succeed
in mobilizing the peasantry, other non-governmental organizations were able to operate more
effectively in the highlands. Two socialist confederations were particularly active. The National
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Agrarian Confederation (CAN) was established in 1974 under official auspices. 10 Some top
government officials apparently hoped that CAN would provide a vehicle for government control
over the peasantry, but CAN resisted such a role. A second confederation, the Peruvian Peasant
Confederation (CCP), also experienced considerable growth during the 70’s. Peasants from both
these groups occupied arable land on large haciendas and the government accepted their
takeover. However, as CAN became more independent and larger in numbers, the
administration declared it illegal and disbanded it.
These two groups provide examples of the peasantry’s ability to mobilize with outside
influence and underscore the importance of dedicated leadership in that process. In part as a
result of recruitment by the two confederations, the vote for the Marxist left skyrocketed in the
Peruvian highlands. For example, 40 percent of the vote in the highlands and 27 percent
nationwide went to Marxists candidates in 1978. 11 This was an important indicator of the
growing radicalization of the Peruvian countryside.
Another reason for the Marxist appeal was the increasingly unequal distribution of
income. The economy of Peru was almost entirely export-oriented and centered in the coastal
and urban centers. Nearly all goods produced were sold outside the country and most of the
companies producing the goods were foreign-owned; therefore, little of the money found its way
to the government or Peruvian economy. These companies also provided the best-paying jobs to
the few lucky enough to get them, mainly the better educated Peruvians of Spanish heritage who
lived in these urban centers. The rest of the poorly paid workers in these regions were turning to
leftist workers’ unions. In contrast, the mountainous interior of Peru was grossly
underdeveloped and populated by Indians. The only foreign-owned businesses were mining10
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related and the Indians who worked in the mines were exploited and paid very low wages and
thus receptive to appeals by Marxist groups. Additionally, this reliance on foreign-owned
corporations made it difficult for the government to generate the revenue needed to carry out
reforms that might ameliorate the plight of the masses.
These conditions set the stage for the emergence of a group such as Sendero Luminoso.
The government was unable to respond adequately to the needs of the people of Peru in general
and the poverty-stricken peasants in particular. This was true for both the elected leaders like
President Belaúnde and the military junta. Also, the activities of groups such as CAN and CCP
demonstrated that the peasants could organize and take action. Finally, education reform led to
an increasing number of peasants becoming educated, but unable to find jobs in the weak
economy. The result was growing resentment which resulted in mass protests and workers
strikes throughout Peru by the end of the 1970’s. Military leaders grew disillusioned and agreed
to a restoration of civilian rule. At the time, however, they made it clear that they were leaving
the government, but not relinquishing power. 12
Communism per se has never had widespread appeal in Peruvian society - the major
political parties, such as PAP and APRA, were anti-Communist – but Marxist ideology had
developed a significant following. 13 However, there were several influential Marxist thinkers,
the most prominent of which was José Carlos Mariátegui, who helped to found a Communist
Party in 1929 that affiliated with the Communist International. 14 Mariátegui was a vocal
advocate of land reform because, he argued, the people of Peru could never be free until they had
dealt decisively with the question of land-to-the-tiller. He believed that the large estates had to
12
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be broken up and the land distributed to the peasants. He envisioned the creation of a utopian
society based on ancient Incan collectivism and communal traditions. 15 Mariátegui died in April
1930 without having realized his dream.
In the late 1950’s, the split between Beijing and Moscow created new opportunities for
Latin American revolutionaries. The Maoist model of peasant-based revolution inspired Latin
Americans long dissatisfied with the bureaucratized orthodox communist parties. Chinese
Communist influence grew in the region, a fact highlighted by the trip to China by several
communist leaders from Peru at the invitation of the Chinese government. 16 This provided the
opportunity for young, impressionable individuals to see first-hand the events in China and the
application of “true communism” by Mao Zedong. It also led to the development of a group
committed to spreading its own form of Maoism based on the Chinese experiences.
Marxism found its greatest appeal among the intellectuals, historians and economists.
Many of these leftists taught in the universities, which gave them the ability to influence the
student population. Even in the late 1960s during the Velasco regime, they gained greater
influence by defending ultra-nationalist causes. 17 Despite this broad exposure, these groups
were unable to organize or effect any real change in Peru.
Sendero Luminoso was much shrewder and more dedicated than the Peruvian guerrillas
of the 1960s, and much more effective in building an alliance between its militants and the
peasantry. According to Sendero propaganda, it traces its roots to Mariátegui’s vision of a
utopian society achieved through violence and preserved through dictatorship. 18 In contrast to
earlier revolutionary groups, Sendero Luminoso did not simply arm the peasantry and attempt to
15
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foment unrest, but instead studied its culture in order to understand its motivations and needs. In
this regard, Sendero’s patience, dedication, and long-term perspective have been virtually unique
among Peruvian revolutionary groups. 19 This long-range approach, as well as leadership and
organization, were the keys to its success.
Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, the original leader of Sendero Luminoso, was a political
activist in Ayacucho for more than fifteen years before the group launched its violent campaign.
Guzmán was born on December 3, 1934 in Arequipa, a large city off Peru’s southern coast. He
joined the Communist Party of Peru (PCP) at the age of fifteen as it was splitting along MarxistMaoist lines. Guzmán recalled in an interview his childhood memories of strikes and protests
and confrontation between the Apristas and Communists. At the same time he began studying
Marxist material because he found it interesting. He graduated from the University of Arequipa,
where he had earned degrees in philosophy and law with theses on the “Kantian Theory of
Space” and “The Bourgeois Democratic State.”

20

Guzmán began teaching philosophy at the National University of San Cristobal of
Huamanga in Ayacucho in 1962. He was also active mobilizing support for his belief in the
armed struggle and disseminating his message among the more charismatic and popular teachers.
He organized and committed significant effort to political meetings and discussions at his home.
Guzmán was one of the main reasons the PCP split into two factions, when he formed the Red
Faction or Bandera Roja (Red Flag) of the communist party in 1963, which advocated armed
conflict and followed the Maoist philosophy of peasant revolution. Guzmán voiced disdain for
any movement that differed from his own; he felt that only through a violent armed revolution
could any real change occur and that anything else would be wasted effort.
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Guzmán guided the Red Faction toward his goal of creating a revolution in Peru starting
in the countryside and eventually surrounding the cities. In other words, by creating a peasant
revolution in the Andean highlands, the insurgency would starve out the cities that rely on the
produce from the peasants and eventually create unrest and revolution in the cities. During this
time, a series of peasant protests and strikes forced the government to make concessions to their
demands. Guzmán felt vindicated that the peasantry could bring about change. In 1964, the PCP
split again with one faction joining other leftist groups to form the People’s Defense Front, a
group advocating use of the electoral process. Guzmán demonstrated his commitment to violent
revolution when he declined to join this front. He criticized the new coalition as ineffective and
not representative of the interests of the peasants and insisted that the party be rebuilt by
upholding “Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought and the thought of Mariátegui,” and by
sweeping away revisionism. 21 Guzmán consistently adhered to his philosophy advocating the
need for violent revolution, following the theories of Chairman Mao. In 1965, Guzmán traveled
to China during the height of the Cultural Revolution and witnessed the revolutionary
transformation taking place, including the actions of the Red Guard and the relentless combat
against revisionism. 22 The visit profoundly influenced him and shaped his thought and
philosophy. Although Mao later admitted that the Cultural Revolution had been wrong, Guzmán
never wavered. He came away from his trip convinced of the need for a protracted people’s war,
one that would target the “three mountains that weigh on the people: imperialism, bureaucratcapitalism, and semi-feudalism.” 23
By 1966, Guzmán and the Red Faction gained control of the University council which led
to support for Guzmán among Ayacucho’s urban population. This gave him control of the
21
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university newspaper, which he used to publish fiery editorials and articles that ridiculed the
government.

By 1969, Guzmán was the head of Academics for the Department of Humanities.

He promptly changed the curriculum to promote his agenda of armed revolution. In response to
the growing communist threat, the Velasco regime ordered the arrest of the leaders of the
People’s Defense Front and the Red Faction of the PCP. Guzmán used his short stay in jail to
win key leaders over to his cause, which ultimately allowed him to consolidate power in the Red
Faction and his idea of armed conflict. This consolidation left two main groups in the party: the
Red Faction in Ayacucho led by Guzmán, and the Bolshevik faction centered in Lima.
Eventually, the group in Lima splintered after failing to achieve any significant gains through the
electoral process, leaving Guzmán’s faction as the de facto Communist party, which adopted the
name Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path around 1970. By 1976 he had developed sufficient
internal control to establish base areas in preparation for armed struggle. 24
Guzmán focused on the education system as a means of developing the cadres necessary
to carry the word to the peasantry in the countryside. As a result, the students learning under his
radical curriculum eventually became teachers in the surrounding peasant communities. From
this time until 1981, the university produced roughly 5,000 teachers. Although there is no data
on how many of these teachers were Senderistas, the number was significant because by the mid
1970’s, Sendero Luminoso virtually controlled the entire high school education system in
Ayacucho. 25
During the Seventh Plenum of April 1977, the party adopted the slogan “Construction
serving the armed struggle” and Guzmán began sending his cadres into the countryside to build
regional committees or shadow governing bodies. The next year, the party endorsed “Outline for
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the Armed Struggle,” which made the countryside the principal theater of action and in June
1979 the Party announced the People’s War. Prior to launching the People’s War, Guzmán had
to overcome several obstacles, including removing those who doubted that revolutionary
conditions existed and that an uprising could be successful, and those who still believed that nonviolent means were best. This led to the formation of the “First Company in Deeds,” a group
made up of the most loyal followers pledged to be the first to start the revolution. 26 The initial
plan was to boycott the upcoming elections and then begin armed conflict. The First Company
would conduct acts of sabotage and military assaults, armed agitation and selective annihilation,
and distribute propaganda.
Sendero Luminoso fanatically adhered to the policies set forth by Abimael Guzmán.
Members of Sendero Luminoso or Senderistas consider themselves “Gang of Four Maoists.”
During the consolidation of power in the communist party this fanaticism appealed more to the
students than to the peasants. Sendero Luminoso has shown little inclination to changing its
ideology, remaining fully committed to installing Marxist oriented rule. Its leadership points out
that
it is through violence that our people have conquered their economic
gains, rights, and freedoms. Everything in fact was won through revolutionary
violence, in ardent battles against the reactionary violence; that is how the eight
hour day was won, our lands were conquered and defended, our rights were won
and tyrants were overthrown. Revolutionary violence is, therefore, the very
essence of our historical process.…[I]t is easy to understand that the development
and victory of the Peruvian revolution, of our democratic revolution, the
emancipation of the people and the class, will be achieved solely through the
greatest revolutionary war of our people, raising the masses in arms through the
People’s War. 27
The members of Sendero Luminoso say that they carry their “lives on their
fingertips,” ready to give their lives for the cause on a moment’s notice to advance the
26
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world revolution. 28 As a matter of fact, Guzmán and other leaders of Sendero Luminoso
felt that once the revolution advanced in Peru, it would be the catalyst for a world-wide
revolution, serving as the example for millions of what was possible through violence.
Guzmán was convinced that, by defeating the enemy and controlling small rural
communities, more peasants would join the revolution, enabling them to ultimately capture the
cities. For good measure, he added that the struggle would free Peru from Yankee domination
while serving the worldwide proletarian revolution. 29 Guzmán stated three laws that govern the
People’s War: People’s War in the countryside to the city; construction of the revolutionary
armed forces, the People’s Guerrilla Army; strategy and tactics that are formed through the
encirclement and annihilation campaigns. 30 He outlined additional goals including peasant
participation in government, repudiation of foreign debt, and nationalization of foreign
companies and holdings. Guzmán’s philosophy became known as ‘Gonzalo Thought,’ so named
because the party faithful knew him as Chairman Gonzalo. He also claimed to be the ‘fourth
sword of Marxism’ after Lenin, Marx, and Mao Zedong. 31
Sendero Luminoso is organized around three main divisions: the central apparatus, the
People’s Guerrilla Army, and the Popular Front. The first consists of a Politburo of five
members who form the real decision-making body of the party. The Politburo uses the Central
Committee consisting of nineteen members to disseminate orders and guidance to six regional
committees based on geographic regions. 32 The Popular Front is made up of several legal
organizations that provide support functions to the leaders and the People’s Guerrilla Army,
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including recruiting, legal defense for arrested members, and family support for members killed
in action or imprisoned.
Guzmán structured the People’s Guerrilla Army after the pattern Mao Zedong laid out in
his works and based upon the cell. Each cell consists of five to ten members, each with
specialized duties. There is little to no intercellular contact in order to minimize damage should
government force capture a cell member. 33 The cell leader receives orders from a commander,
who controls several cells, loosely resembling a platoon structure. These commanders also
report to a company commander who is usually a member of the local People’s Committee. The
People’s Guerrilla Army not only fights, but participates in the organization and daily
functioning of the base areas. The base area is a geographic locality where the government
forces are subject to hostile action and revolutionaries receive at least passive support, and not
actual structures built in the countryside. People’s Committees, elected by a delegate assembly
composed of one-third each of party members, poor peasants, and middle-class peasants, govern
the base areas. These committees divide the land that has been taken from the big landlords and
the government, first to those who have none, then to those who have some land already. The
People’s Committees also enforce collective planting and harvesting with assistance from the
People’s Guerrilla Army. They form new laws and provide justice in the base areas by
organizing people’s trials where mass meetings of the community vote to decide the guilt or
innocence of someone accused of a crime and to decide penalties. Sendero formed dozens of
these committees to replace the local governments in areas they controlled. Several base areas
and their people’s committees were grouped together under the control of regional committees,
composed of senior military and political representatives from the people’s committees.
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Within each base area or district, the people’s committee selects an overall military
commander and several political commissioners. This group also functions under Guzmán’s
control, as the forum for both military and political matters. The commander forms the soldiers
into several groups with responsibilities for local sentry duties, reconnaissance, arresting traitors,
and preventing dissemination of enemy propaganda. They also provide stretcher-bearers,
distribute food, and conduct comfort missions. 34
During its formation and consolidation, Sendero Luminoso not only replaced the
government organizations with its own people’s committees, but had to impose its own societal
laws on the people to indoctrinate them fully into the communist party. Prior to the start of the
guerrilla war, Guzmán consolidated power not only through the University, but also through the
regional committee of Ayacucho; all to continue to forward the premise that only through violent
action could change occur. Guzmán directed the regional committee to conduct three main
functions: political indoctrination of the peasantry, military training, and logistical support of the
guerrillas. 35
Ayacucho was an ideal area to launch Guzmán’s People’s War. The region possessed a
rebellious cultural tradition, having consistently voted opposition candidates to the assembly in
successive elections. Sendero’s popularity in Ayacucho derived from the leaders’ ability to
identify with its social base and address local concerns. Sendero neither promoted nor restricted
religious observations and conducted all training using Quechua, which is the main language of
the peasants.
Outside leadership is of particular consequence in turning localized rural rebellions into
nationally coordinated revolutionary movements. Peasants typically engage in revolutionary
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activity when a revolutionary elite adds a new layer of leadership and doctrine to peasant life. 36
Sendero was unique among Peruvian Marxist groups in its openness to young provincial
militants as leaders. Initially, the group’s leadership was predominantly white intellectuals, but
by 1980 the leadership was largely Ayacucho-born. These locally-developed militants pushed to
begin the armed struggle in 1980. In contrast to previous Peruvian revolutionaries from middleclass backgrounds, the Senderistas were prepared to live austerely for many years in remote,
bleak places. They learned the Indian language if they did not already know it and often married
into the communities. Much of Sendero’s strength came from its success in garnering support
from the Peruvian Indians, a segment comprising close to one-half of the country’s population.
Successive governments ignored and even suppressed the Indians, making them ideal candidates
for recruitment in subversive movements. Authorities ignored the Indian population to the extent
that it was almost inevitable that it forge links with revolutionary movements. 37
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CHAPTER 3 SENDERO ACTION AND EFFECT
Sendero Luminoso capitalized on the worsening economic and social situation in Peru
and was fully prepared to launch its insurgency. Conversely, the security forces were not
ready to conduct a counterinsurgency - the military was organized for a conventional war
against its neighbors and the police suffered from years of under-funding and poor training.
The government, in general, was not prepared to face a challenge from a well-organized,
aggressive guerrilla force due to poor relationships between the administration and security
forces, especially the military. This situation manifested itself as Belaúnde chose to first,
ignore the initial Sendero actions and then later, offer limited response. Sendero benefited
from the weak response by expanding to a serious force that threatened the Peruvian
government, which finally deployed the military to counter the insurgents – marking the
country’s descent into a state of general violence.

During the 1980’s, Latin American countries were experiencing great economic
hardship as a result of years of increasing debt. The situation in Peru in 1980 was one of
despair. Most of Peru’s economy was geared toward making loan payments to its creditors,
resulting in spiraling inflation, business closures and unemployment. Peru’s gross domestic
product fell by 8.3% from 1981 to 1983. 1 The people at the bottom of the economic ladder,
the peasants, suffered the most because nearly all of their sources of income disappeared
completely.
This economic uncertainty and social injustice provided a fertile environment for
terrorist activity. The Sierra was among the hardest hit regions and this allowed Guzmán and
Sendero Luminoso to continue to develop the movement and gain followers. Sendero
1
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capitalized on the bleak economic conditions across the country by recruiting among the
various disgruntled groups such as striking workers, anti-government political protesters, and
peasants. Another potential target for Sendero recruitment was the coca farmers and
narcotraffickers. Peru was under pressure from the United States to conduct coca eradication
efforts and these measures angered the coca farmers. Coca cultivation was the only means of
income for many of the peasants and government eradication policy did not provide for
substitute crops.
This economic and social crisis was the precise condition Guzmán needed to launch
Sendero Luminoso into action. All the government economic relief was focused on the
economically developed Costa region. The people of the Sierra were suffering at belowsubsistence levels and looking for relief. Sendero Luminoso cadre promised the peasants a
better life if they were willing to join the cause. Guzmán’s vision of a peasant-governed
society appealed to many who were convinced the Lima government did not care about them.
The time for action had finally come.
The government forces that would oppose Sendero Luminoso varied in quality and
capability. The Peruvian military consists of three services, the Army, the Navy (including
the Marine Corps), and the Air Force. The Army is considered the primary service and
consists of 85,000 soldiers, mostly of Indian descent. 2 The officer corps is made up of
mestizos, or mixed personnel with a mostly middle class background. The Navy has about
27,000 personnel and is considered an exclusive career path for well-off white Peruvians. 3
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The Air force consists of about 15,000 personnel and is primarily involved in counter
narcotics operations. 4
Despite the loss of U.S. support during the Velasco regime, the Army, on paper, was a
formidable one indeed. The American government withdrew military support to Peru after
the Velasco coup and over human rights issues. The Carter administration continued sending
vocal and angry rhetoric to Central and South America to improve its human rights record. In
response to this pressure, many Latin American countries, including Peru, renounced U.S.
assistance. This allowed the Soviet Union to move into Latin America. Moscow viewed the
break between the U.S. and Latin America as an exploitable situation. Many of these
countries welcomed Soviet arms dealers and advisors, including Peru.
As it turns out, Peru was the only Latin American country to buy Soviet hardware. In
1982, Peru purchased several Su-22 Fighter bombers, Mi-8 Hip helicopters, T-55 medium
tanks, antiaircraft artillery, SA-3 and SA-7 missiles and small arms. 5 In all, Peru spent close
to $1.2 billion dollars on hardware and technical assistance. 6 It also made purchases from
France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Israel. Even the U.S. sold arms to Peru as it
agreed to tougher counter-drug efforts. The philosophy of the military leaders was simple:
‘the best arms at the best price, regardless of the seller.’ This made the Peruvian military one
of the most modern and formidable in Latin America. Of course, the military was not geared
toward a counterinsurgency fight, but a conventional ground war against its neighboring
countries, Ecuador and Chile, with which it had engaged in several border clashes in the past.
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In 1980, all three services and the National Intelligence Service (SIN) operated under
the direct control of the President, the commander in chief. The military also formed a Joint
Command of the Armed Forces that established military policy, training priorities, and
conducted routine operations during peacetime. The Joint Command was headed by a
Chairman, the position rotating among the services in one-year terms. This organization
appeared to give the President of Peru great power, but the military and intelligence services
were not integrated which resulted, on several occasions, in the military being operationally
and tactically surprised. In addition, the Joint Command could overrule the commander in
chief and therefore actually controlled the military. This relationship forced the chief
executive to seek the approval of the Joint Command prior to taking any action that might
impact on the military.
In contrast to the military, the Peruvian police, poorly manned, funded and equipped,
were among the worst in Latin America. The force consists of three divisions under the
direction of the Ministry of Interior with about 5,000 personnel total. 7 The Civil Guard,
similar to a typical metropolitan police force, is the largest division and is responsible for
crime control and general security. The next division is the Republican Guard, which is
responsible for prison security and special guard duties, such as the President’s guard. The
third division is the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP), a plainclothes force comparable in
duties to the FBI. Each of the divisions possessed its own specialized counterterrorism or
counterinsurgency unit. The Civil Guard operated the Sinchi counterinsurgency battalion,
roughly 400 personnel. The Republican Guard manned the Llapan Atic counterterrorism unit,
similar to a SWAT team. The PIP had a large counterterrorism directorate (DIRCOTE). At
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the start of the 1980s, none of these organizations were capable of conducting security
operations against a dedicated foe.
Sendero initiated its first actions in May 1980, just after the military relinquished
power to Belaúnde. These consisted of random acts of terror, such as assassinating local
government officials and sabotaging unguarded infrastructure, a Phase I insurgency according
to U.S. military doctrine. Senderistas moved into many mountain communities, combining
ideological indoctrination with physical intimidation against those who resisted their call to
smash authority and establish an egalitarian utopia. The insurgents then embarked on a
campaign of low-risk, high-profile terrorist attacks consisting primarily of dynamiting
electrical towers, public buildings, and such symbols of authority as the Justice Ministry and
police posts. 8 These first actions were minor irritants to the government and confusing to the
people, who did not understand their implications. A Communist Party pamphlet described
the action as “striking with agitation and armed propaganda through the seizure of radio
stations, leaflets, and posters.” 9 These pamphlets went on to describe these initial strikes as
“a defiant political blow of transcendental significance that, displaying rebellious red flags
and hoisting hammers and sickles, proclaimed: ‘It is right to rebel’ and ‘Power grows from
the barrel of a gun.’” 10
The various independent cells continued to carry out acts of terrorism in the Sierra and
occasionally around Lima. Intermittently, these cells joined together in detachments to
conduct larger operations. Most of the activity occurred around the provinces of Ayrabamba
and Ayasarca and around the outskirts of Lima. One of the more daring early actions was
setting fire to the San Martin municipal building. These early acts were in keeping with
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Guzmán’s philosophy of focusing the rebellion in the countryside and surrounding the cities.
At this time, Sendero Luminoso consisted only of a few armed cells and possessed only crude
weapons including, revolvers, a few shotguns, and a small amount of dynamite stolen from
local mining companies. In one example of Guzmán’s hearkening to the Incan traditions of
the peasants, his cells used old Incan slings to hurl the dynamite at the targets. 11
Armed with these few crude weapons, and also with clubs and knives and sometimes
even fake wooden rifles, the cells attacked the local landlords or large landowners and divided
their holdings among the peasants. This redistribution of land among the peasants was
extremely popular. For years they had waited for promised government land reform. Sendero
Luminoso moved in and accomplished what the government was unable to do.
Although the early Sendero attacks centered on the Andean highlands, they
occasionally struck selected sites in the cities, especially in Lima. One of the favorite targets
was the United States. Sendero cells attacked anything they considered symbols of Yankee
imperialism, such as the Bayer chemical plant, the U.S. Embassy, and the symbolic Kennedy
statue in the affluent Lima suburb of Miraflores. 12 From 1980 until 1982, by carrying out
these effective, small-unit actions across a large area of Peru, Sendero was able to establish
control in extensive areas of Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurimac. Some of the more
notable attacks during this time include the attack on the U.S. Embassy on August 31, 1981,
when dynamite thrown from a passing car caused structural damage to the chancery and
ambassador’s residence. By October 1981, the government had declared a state of emergency
in Cangello, La Mar, Huanta, and Victor Fijardo provinces. Established for 60 days, it
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granted the government extra powers to impose curfews, detain people, and restrict freedom
of movement. 13
According to Communist Party propaganda, the development of the guerrilla war had
three components: armed strikes, conquering bases, and developing the bases. 14 The armed
strikes lasted from May 1981 to December 1982 with the main objective of taking control of
more areas of Peru in order to establish base areas. Guzmán later called this period the War
of Little Wars, denoting the independence of the separate actions. The group’s supporting
effort during this time was to capture or steal as many weapons as possible in order to equip
the growing number of insurgents who flocked to the cause. The rebels continued to attack
the local leaders or gamonales as the primary target as well as isolated, weakly defended
police detachments as a secondary target. Once they gained control of an area, they
established People’s Committees to replace the local governing body. These committees
ensured that an area, once under Sendero control, remained under Sendero control, initially by
providing services and benefits to the people. For example, the insurgents often entered a
village and rid the area of thieves, abusive bureaucrats, and other undesirable people. They
also provided services such as education, agricultural assistance, and medical care. Those that
did not willingly participate were subjected to intimidation and violence. The People’s
Committees were the key to the consolidation of Sendero power over growing areas of the
Andean highlands. In two short years, Sendero Luminoso expanded to a phase II guerrilla
war.
By 1982, Sendero Luminoso was well on its way to controlling several provinces in
and around Ayacucho and was becoming increasingly bolder in its attacks. It also continued
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to target U.S. and other foreign-owned or associated structures. The U.S. Embassy reported
that the insurgency posed a threat to government stability and confirmed that the insurgents
were arming themselves with small arms and machineguns purchased in Peru or stolen from
police and military posts. 15 The rebels funded their operations during these early years
through robberies, typically striking buses filled with foreign tourists.
Sendero was attracting increasing numbers of followers. New recruits were subjected
to extensive political indoctrination and paramilitary training conducted at clandestine
“people’s schools” prior to being put into cells to carry out attacks. Additionally, new recruits
often conducted their initial attacks alone under a single leader in order to prove their
commitment to the cause. These measures increased security from penetration by security
personnel, but also limited the speed of growth and size of the insurgent force. Nevertheless,
as a testament to their increasing popularity among young peasants, in a 1982 poll 82 percent
listed Sendero Luminoso as the most appealing group to join. 16
The Belaúnde government’s weak response to the insurgency also contributed to rebel
popularity. For more than two years, the government deliberately ignored the Sendero
rebellion. In most public statements, Belaúnde referred to members of Sendero Luminoso as
thugs and bandits and attempted to dismiss the threat they posed. The administration sent the
Sinchi battalion to Ayacucho in a feeble attempt to restore order, but the unit was abusive to
the people and ineffective against Sendero. 17 Belaúnde was hesitant to use the military
because he feared its leaders. He remembered how General Velasco had ousted him in 1968
and the experience left him timid when dealing with the military. The remoteness of the areas
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that Sendero Luminoso occupied also made it difficult to mount an effective campaign of
repression against them.
In March 1982, Sendero Luminoso ushered in a new phase of the rebellion. In a wellcoordinated military offensive, 300 guerrillas operating in three separate columns, assaulted
and held the maximum security prison of Ayacucho and released a total of 247 prisoners,
including over 100 suspected terrorists. 18 The rebels followed this success with simultaneous
strikes on several civil guard posts and municipal offices. The insurgents also sabotaged the
electrical towers near Lima, blacking out the city for several hours. Communist Party
propaganda described these successful operations:
The people’s Liberation Army carries out guerrilla actions against the
armed forces, leads the masses to attack and liberate the so-called “strategic
hamlets” of the government, carries out assassinations of proven enemies of
the people, and carries out sabotage of the economic foundations of the old
state. In cities they have conducted massive armed strikes that have paralyzed
commerce and industry for days at a time- preparing the masses in the cities
for insurrection, basing themselves mainly in the vast shantytowns of urban
poor that surround the city centers. 19
This forced Belaúnde to act. He expanded the emergency zone to include sixteen
provinces in Ayacucho and the neighboring departments of Apurimac and Huancavelica. The
emergency zone decree allowed the police to move in once again and assume control of the
region by restricting movement and suspending civil rights. Government forces could detain
individuals for weeks without cause. Human rights groups accused the police of committing
many atrocities once they moved into areas and some statistics seem to support those claims.
For example, there had been only fourteen civilian casualties prior to 1982 and none were
listed as missing or ‘disappeared’ – a popular term used to describe those who were missing
and presumed dead at the hands of the government – but once the police moved in, the
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numbers increased. The real victims were the peasants. On one side, they had the
government, which curtailed their movement, imposed curfews, and treated them harshly. On
the other side, the Senderistas threatened to kill anyone suspected of supporting or
cooperating with the government. As one peasant stated, the situation was a “plague on both
your houses.” 20 One thing was clear: Sendero Luminoso had gained the government’s
attention and was becoming a serious guerrilla force.
How could Sendero Luminoso – essentially, a band of organized peasants with crude
weapons and no formal military training – achieve such success? Most of it can be attributed
to the laxity and inefficiency of the civilian security forces. Rivalries among the various
intelligence and law enforcement organizations hampered the government’s efforts. The
competing organizations often refused to share information or to follow up leads. The
administration needed to modernize and restructure these groups to centralize intelligence and
law enforcement activities and facilitate closer coordination. There was no doubt that the
situation was getting worse throughout Peru.
For much of 1982, government authorities in the Ayacucho department withdrew from
small, exposed outposts to static, defensive positions in larger communities. Sendero
Luminoso units expanded into evacuated areas and maintained pressure on the demoralized
police and civil authorities through a campaign of assassinations, ambushes, and attacks on
isolated outposts. Still, Belaúnde hoped he could avoid committing the military and use the
police to maintain order. But despite Belaúnde’s hesitance to use the military, several factors
made military intervention more likely including evidence of increasing popular support for
Sendero Luminoso, expanding terrorist activity in the northern and jungle regions of Peru, and
larger and more sophisticated operations against important government targets.
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Finally, at the end of the year, President Belaúnde granted control of the
counterinsurgency to the military. The military quickly moved into Sendero-controlled areas
and performed defensive functions, while the police – benefiting from military transportation,
communications, and weaponry - conducted more aggressive patrolling. In December, the
armed forces entered Ayacucho and launched an ambitious counterinsurgency campaign. The
addition of the military to the fight against Sendero Luminoso instantly improved morale
across the various government agencies. The military, in general, behaved much better
toward the populace than did the Sinchis and other police forces, and popular support for the
government started to rise. The restoration of the government presence in small towns and
villages put pressure on Sendero and caused the withdrawal of its activists from communities
where previously they had enjoyed free rein. The use of the military also freed the Civil
Guard from extra guard duties, thereby enabling the police to take a more aggressive stance
and initiate security patrols in the countryside, which encouraged locals to inform on Sendero
sympathizers and activists. These factors brought about a major consequence – it forced
Sendero Luminoso increasingly to use violence and coercion against the peasants in order to
receive support.
Prior to the military counterinsurgency campaign in the south central highlands,
Sendero Luminoso generally had enjoyed active support among the peasant population in the
emergency zone, followed Maoist ideals, and was helpful to the people. After the military
offensive, Sendero Luminoso increasingly had to resort to coercion of the population in order
to maintain control. If the peasants provided support at all, it was only passive, consisting
mostly of information on recent military activity. The peasants no longer willingly spied on
the government forces, nor willingly fed and sheltered Senderistas, out of fear that military

36
patrols would find out and impose their own swift justice. When the military entered a
Sendero-controlled village, the insurgents would disappear into the surrounding countryside,
leaving the villagers at the mercy of the military patrols. The soldiers dealt harshly with those
they suspected of aiding the insurgency. Senderistas often returned to villages right after the
military units departed and assassinated ‘traitors’ or anyone believed to be helping the
government.
The military offensive also produced a climate of revenge and a flood of rumors,
including some regarding the alleged death of Guzmán. 21 The rebels claimed that the
government encouraged peasants to kill Senderistas or anyone suspected of being an
insurgent. Belaúnde countered that the violence stemmed from long-standing rivalries
between highland communities. When the military moved into a new area, the local leaders
often informed the commander that Senderistas were active in neighboring villages or
provinces, when in fact they were just trying to enact revenge for old disputes. The
government also charged that Sendero Luminoso was being supported by foreign countries or
groups, but the available evidence indicates it was not. For example, most weapons captured
from the rebels were of local registry. 22 Belaúnde probably made the claim in order to
enhance the chances of receiving foreign assistance himself. Despite some negative results,
there is no denying that the military involvement hampered Sendero Luminoso and was a
popular move among the security forces and the population. One senior Army General said
that the president took the right approach in giving the military a secondary role and leaving
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the police as the main effort because it allowed the military to initiate civic action projects to
gain further public support. 23
In response to the new military campaign and series of Sendero setbacks early in 1983,
Guzmán outlined a new strategy he called ‘the Great Plan of Conquering Bases.’ 24 This plan
outlined four tasks: 1) a general reorganization of the party, 2) the creation of the People’s
Guerrilla Army and the Revolutionary Defense Front of the People, 3) the consolidation of the
People’s Committees in the countryside and the Revolutionary Defense Movement of the
People in the cities, and 4) the Military Plan of Conquering Bases. The reorganization of the
party consisted of decentralizing control of military operations to allow individual cell leaders
more freedom of action to increase the pressure on the government forces and regain control
of the areas lost to them.
Sendero increasingly strayed from the methods that brought it early success. It built
an impressive base of support among the population by blending into the community. The
rebels provided services and established law and order and reversed years of government
neglect. Yet, when the security forces moved in, Sendero abandoned its long-term strategy of
making friends and building alliances among traditionally oppressed villagers. Instead, the
Senderistas became oppressive and abusive, coercing support among the people. This caused
Sendero Luminoso to lose much of its support. The peasants and people living in the
emergency zone pragmatically showed support to whoever happened to be controlling the
immediate area at the time.
The military knew it had to do something to consolidate gains and this resulted in the
government’s initiating a civil works campaign in order to improve the life of the people in

23
24

Ibid, p. 4.
Military Line, p. 7; Simon Strong, Shining Path: The World’s Deadliest Revolutionary Force, p. 102.

38
the emergency zone and retain their support. The government committed millions of dollars
and built new infrastructure such as roads, improvements on the electrical grid, and improved
water supplies. In an effort to demonstrate confidence that his policies were working,
Belaúnde made a surprise visit to the city of Ayacucho in June 1983. 25 The Ministers of the
Interior and Energy and Mines, as well as all three service ministers and the commanding
generals of Peru’s three national police forces accompanied him. The president reviewed a
military honor guard, presided over a downtown parade by military and police units, and
participated in a flag raising ceremony where he paid tribute to the security forces engaged in
countering Sendero Luminoso. He also made several high-profile visits to various other
towns, in some cases to inaugurate public works projects and emphasize the efforts the
government was making for the people.
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CHAPTER 4 GOVERNMENT RESPONSE (1983-1990)
For the remainder of the 1980’s, Peru witnessed an erratic counterinsurgency
campaign, as successive administrations wrestled with competing demands in an attempt to
defeat Sendero. Belaúnde ceded control of the counterinsurgency to the military at the
expense of civic works projects. The military established its presence throughout the
Emergency Zone and worked to restore local governments, including creating local militias to
help defend government-controlled areas. The security forces had some successes, but were
better known for a series of abuses and atrocities. Additionally, the chief executive failed to
balance counter-narcotics efforts with the counterinsurgency and lost U.S. support, while
driving the narco-industry to Sendero for protection. By the time of Belaúnde’s ouster in the
national elections, Peru was an abusive martial state and the insurgency was spreading to new
regions. The new president, Alan Garcia, attempted to address the needs of the population
while bringing the military under control. He launched a series of expensive civic projects,
while reorganizing the military to make it more responsive to civilian control. The
government also offered amnesty to the insurgents and increased its support to the local
militias. The administration was successful in reducing the insurgency to previous levels, but
its economic initiatives eventually proved catastrophic to the economy and the
counterinsurgency. By the time of his defeat in the national elections, the economy was in
disarray, death squads appeared and Sendero was once again on the rise.

The military expanded its counterinsurgency campaign throughout the Emergency
Zone beginning in 1983. Its first priority was to identify pro-Sendero communities and then
send company-sized patrols into those areas. The forces conducted raids on suspected
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insurgent strongholds in order to kill or capture guerrillas, but the raids often resulted in
arbitrary acts of violence against the populace. Soldiers often burned entire villages, and
there were many reports of rapes, beatings, torture and other atrocities. Later, government
officials learned of multiple mass graves in the area which the locals attributed to this
violence. 1 The second priority was to reestablish civilian control in the emergency zone.
One method the military employed was to create local civil defense patrols among the peasant
community, otherwise known as Rondas Campesinos or Montoneras. 2 These groups
defended the communities against Sendero incursions and relieved the government forces
from having to garrison towns. Unfortunately, they also often abused their power, further
escalating the violence.
According to members of Sendero Luminoso, the military campaign was nothing more
than persecution, repression, and torture of the peasants. On several occasions, troops moved
into villages and imprisoned large numbers of residents, sometimes capturing insurgents, and
then killed them and placed them in mass graves. The most hated of the various security
forces was the Sinchis, the counterinsurgency battalion of the Civil Guard. Since first
operating in the area in 1982, the Sinchis earned a reputation for being extremely brutal.
Former prisoners routinely accused the Sinchis of torturing prisoners, raping women, and
murdering suspected insurgents. 3 The counterguerrilla activity created a condition of general
violence, also known as the Dirty War, in the southern Sierra. In all, from 1983 to 1984, more
than 8,700 Peruvians were killed and another 4,000 “disappeared.” 4 Guzmán claimed that
these harsh government actions aided the revolution by increasing the size of the People’s
1
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Guerrilla Army, creating more People’s committees and base areas, and adding to the party.
Years later, he spoke in an interview about the most difficult test Sendero Luminoso had to
face was the government’s ‘genocide’ of 1983 and 1984 – how they fought through those
great difficulties and came out strengthened. 5
As the counterguerrilla campaign continued into 1984, the violence between the
military and Sendero Luminoso increased to horrible proportions. Each operation resulted in
high casualties. The level of violence was so high that the population became almost
indifferent to the death toll – fifty people in the San Francisco area, thirty peasants in Chiara,
forty after an operation in Rosario, thirty people in Pomabamba, forty commissioners of the
various People’s Committees in Vinchos. 6 By May the Army had established approximately
fifty counterguerrilla bases of one hundred men each in the emergency zone. These soldiers
conducted aggressive patrols, attempted to maintain a constant presence in the villages and
searched for insurgents.
Despite the increasing death tolls, there were signs of progress. President Belaúnde
placed General Adrian Huaman Centero in command of the emergency zone in January 1984.
General Centero improved conditions by enforcing moral behavior within the ranks, which
resulted in fewer reported abuses. He also initiated several small-scale development projects
and met with local civilian leaders on a daily basis to address their grievances. This shift in
focus from counterguerrilla operations to a broad counterinsurgency effort caused the
population to actively support the military – but the support lasted only as long as the military
was present. In most cases, the population supported whoever appeared in their villages,
whether government forces or rebels.
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Police intelligence efforts in the urban areas also showed results in 1984 with the first
arrest of a major Sendero leader. Counterterrorist units found it extremely difficult to
penetrate Sendero cells because of the nature of the insurgent indoctrination program.
Newcomers to the group were isolated and knew only their fellow cell members. Only the
cell leader had contact with Senderistas outside the cell. Therefore, government intelligence
operatives gathered most of their information from citizens who overheard insurgents
discussing operations and possessed enough courage to come forward. Despite these
difficulties, in July 1984, the police were able to arrest Laura Zambrano Padilla, the political
commander of the Lima Metropolitan Regional Committee and director of the group’s local
activities since 1982. 7
As a component of its counterinsurgency efforts, the government conducted effective
information operations to amplify its successes. Starting with Padilla, the police routinely
paraded the captured leaders in front of the media to be broadcast across Peru. The state
included anti-Sendero themes and messages with the broadcast to show the futility of the
rebellion and the fate of those who joined. This practice not only garnered support for the
government, it influenced many against siding with the rebels. The counterinsurgency
operations were improving conditions in the emergency zone, but they also spread the turmoil
to other departments of Peru as the rebels looked to establish new base areas away from
military influence. One of the new areas was the Upper Huallaga Valley, where Sendero
Luminoso first appeared in May. 8
The government’s counterinsurgency campaign forced the leaders of Sendero
Luminoso to look at alternate means to resource their operations. The Upper Hualluga Valley
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(UHV) region to the north of the emergency zone provided the solution. The UHV is Peru’s
richest coca-producing region and was central to the cocaine trade. Under pressure from the
United States, Peru was conducting widespread coca eradication efforts in the UHV, which
deprived farmers of their only source of income and drove them to Sendero for support. The
insurgents protected the farmers and their crops from poorly equipped counter-narcotics
forces and in return received a large payoff from the drug cartels. The rebels also provided
protection to the transporters of the coca leaves as they took the crops into Columbia and
Bolivia for further processing. The counter-narcotics efforts not only provided the insurgents
funding for increased operations, it cost the government critical popular support. A Peruvian
general aptly summed up the dilemma: “We have to have popular support to fight terrorism –
we have to be a friend of the population, and you can’t do that by eradicating coca.” 9
By May 1984, the government had added the Upper Huallaga Valley to the emergency
zone. Most activity centered on Sendero clashes with counter-narcotics police. In contrast to
their efforts in Ayacucho, the insurgents moved into many of the villages and murdered local
officials who did not agree to serve with them. Other officials resigned after receiving death
threats.
As a result, the military commanders ordered counter-narcotics efforts halted in the
UHV and allowed farmers to resume coca cultivation. Almost immediately, this paid
dividends as locals began providing intelligence on Sendero activities. Acting off this new
information, military units successfully trapped several Sendero patrols in the area, but failed
to capture them. Nonetheless, this operation severely curtailed Sendero activity in the UHV.
The Army continued patrolling in the region, forcing many of the insurgents to flee into
9

Frank Lalumiere, Cocaine: A Trans-National Issue, p. 14.

44
adjacent areas where they could conduct only sporadic attacks against poorly defended police
outposts. The halt to coca eradication brought renewed pressure from the United States,
which withdrew aid to Peru.
In response to the spreading violence and increasing threat from Sendero Luminoso,
President Belaúnde granted expanded counterterrorist powers to the military across much of
Peru. Essentially, the military could act almost at will, without any consideration for civil
rights or due process. The police still had jurisdiction over Lima, but they failed to show
visible progress. Despite the arrest of Padilla in July, Sendero forces continued to carry out
attacks on financial institutions and security forces throughout the city, leading Belaúnde to
add it to the military controlled zone. 10 The military was chasing Sendero, it seemed, all over
Peru, but could not deliver the decisive blow. The Belaúnde administration focused almost
entirely on military operations, to the detriment of any civic programs that might improve the
lives of the peasants. The only thing that limited the spread of Sendero support was the
rebels’ own atrocities against those who did not willingly assist them.
At the same time, the Belaúnde administration experienced the first of several major
scandals that signaled trouble ahead. Jaime Ayala, a news reporter, went missing in August
1984, along with six members of a Protestant evangelical church in Callqui. Many peasants
in the area blamed the government forces for their disappearance, and the military, in turn,
blamed Sendero Luminoso. The media also discovered several clandestine mass graves near
Huanta. Belaúnde denied that the security services were responsible and blamed the media
for spreading misinformation, while Army leaders claimed that Sendero Luminoso carried off
their dead after battles and buried them in these graves. Government experts identified the
bodies and discovered that many of the victims were people previously reported as
10
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“disappeared.” They also reported that the victims were males, aged between seventeen and
forty, and disfigured to hinder identification. The victims were bound and blindfolded and
killed by a variety of means. The manner of death did not indicate rebels killed in a firefight
with the military, but executions. Public reaction was one of uniform horror.
At the close of 1984, Sendero Luminoso attempted to disrupt the national elections in
which Belaúnde ran for reelection against Alan Garcia, the Aprista candidate. In October, the
rebels set fire to several electoral offices in villages across Peru. They then attacked two
offices of the National Election Board in Ayacucho and Lima and burned the voting rolls.
The rebels also attacked the registration centers in the central Peruvian towns of Jivia and
Jesus, killing twelve government officials in the process. The Civil Guard finally moved to
secure the election offices and in doing so made several arrests. This protective measure
immediately curtailed Sendero attacks on the electoral offices and influenced the government
to take additional measures. 11
As the elections grew closer in early 1985, Belaúnde increased the military presence in
the emergency zone, sending between 5,000 and 7,000 soldiers into the southern highlands.
He also sent an additional 2,500-3,000 soldiers in the northern highlands and UHV. In all,
over 10 percent of the Army participated in active operations against the rebels. 12 Additional
security forces were maintaining static security positions on key infrastructure. On election
day, the army had nearly 40,000 additional troops at approximately 4,000 polling stations
throughout the country, thwarting Sendero Luminoso’s attempts to ruin the election. 13
Security forces had done well in controlling the group in Ayacucho and other areas in
the southern Sierra. This was mainly due to the counterinsurgency bases established the
11
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previous May and aggressive patrolling over the past year. The community self-defense
groups (rondas campesinos) and the initiation of small-scale development projects was
particularly effective. Sendero’s mobility and well-established support network allowed it to
avoid a crippling blow, but it could no longer completely dominate any region and was on the
defensive. Its recourse to savage terrorism, which included the massacre of entire villages to
deter the population from cooperating with the government, reflected its weakened position.
Sendero’s effectiveness in the UHV was limited due to the lack of established networks and
advanced preparation, such as they had in Ayacucho. Swift military action also hindered the
insurgents in that area. But the counter-narcotics efforts prevented the total elimination of
Sendero in the UHV.
The actions by the security forces hindered the insurgency in Lima, resulting in the
arrest of several urban commanders in mid-1984, but the rebels still managed a few successful
operations during the elections, such as the bombing of two of the political party headquarters
and the assassination of several police officers. Unlike activities in the highlands, operations
in Lima attracted widespread media attention and enhanced Sendero Luminoso’s image as a
major force. The Belaúnde administration attempted to counter this negative publicity by
placing captured Sendero leaders on national television to admit their guilt. This could not
counter the negative publicity, however, and the population lost confidence with the
authorities’ ability to maintain order in Lima.
Despite limiting Sendero to a Phase I or II insurgency, the military under President
Belaúnde never delivered the decisive blow. The insurgents continued to attack isolated Civil
Guard posts, peasant self-defense groups, and vulnerable policemen in the cities. The cyclical
nature of Sendero’s operations (high activity followed by recruiting and planning) allowed
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them to remain a formidable force. The insurgents’ ability to resupply themselves by theft or
attacks made them virtually invulnerable to interdiction efforts. Still, Guzmán’s goal of a
nationwide revolution appeared remote. Sendero lost the momentum it had early in 19801982, but continuing economic difficulties provided it with endless opportunities. Until the
government improved the social and economic conditions that had caused the rebellion in the
first place, Sendero Luminoso would remain a problem.
It was no surprise when President Belaúnde lost the election. Sendero Luminoso
could claim a victory of sorts in the electoral defeat of Belaúnde. Some experts considered
the Belaúnde government “one of the worst governments Peru ever had.” 14 During his
administration, the country had suffered economic decline and ever-escalating violence. The
people were simply tired of the Dirty War that they suffered under the Belaúnde
administration.
The new president, Alan Garcia was the first member of APRA to actually take office
without military intervention. But relations between Garcia and the military were strained
from the beginning. Garcia had based his campaign on a populist platform, promising a
domestic stimulus package and rejection of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies
that many believed had crippled the economy. Like his predecessors, he would have to deal
with massive social and economics problems, ones that Sendero Luminoso would actively
continue to exploit.
After his July 1985 inauguration, President Garcia quickly raised human rights
standards in the security forces. He fired three top generals associated with atrocities and
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instituted training programs to better civil-military relations. 15 He also passed the Law of
Political-Military Commands which established a legal basis for political-military commands
in the Emergency Zone and placed them under the control of the National Defense Council.16
This council consisted of four military officers, including the commanders of the services and
four civilians, including the president, and was responsible for oversight of counterinsurgency
planning. It was hoped this organization would make the military more responsive to civilian
control and thus more likely to demonstrate better human rights practices.
However, the cycle of violence between Sendero and the security forces caused
problems for Garcia from the outset. Only four months into his presidency, a major scandal
broke when the media reported that nearly seventy-five civilians from the village of
Accomarca had been massacred in August. 17 In a familiar scenario, the media, along with
many of the local villagers, blamed military patrols for the massacre. The military, in turn,
blamed Sendero Luminoso. Garcia promised that he would rein in the military and stop such
atrocities and the people looked to him to take swift action. He ordered the congress to
investigate the incident and after several weeks it determined that, in fact, a company
operating from a counterinsurgency base near the village had committed the atrocity. At the
same time and not knowing the results of this investigation, the regional commander, General
Jarama testified before the congressional commission, insisting that his units had not been
involved. Upon learning of the testimony, Garcia called a meeting of the National Defense
Council and ordered Generals Jarama and Mori, another Emergency Zone commander, to
attend. At the meeting, the chief executive criticized the military’s human rights record as
15
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well as its performance in counterguerrilla operations in the Emergency Zone. No senior
military representatives defended the two generals, and Garcia ordered them retired without
benefits. He also dismissed General Cesar Enrico, the Chairman of the Joint Command.
As news of the meeting spread, many in the military feared that Garcia was starting a
purge of military leaders over suspected human rights abuses. 18 To the public, it appeared
that Garcia was openly confronting the military leadership, an unheard of practice among
chief executives. In reality, he previously reached an understanding with the military that he
would not prosecute old cases, but would deal harshly with any new abuses. He also allowed
all military personnel to be tried in military tribunals to avoid civilian courts and lengthy
prison sentences. 19 This gave Garcia a visible public boost early in his presidency, while also
providing him with important support from the military leadership.
The military command followed Garcia’s action by curtailing the activity of the
counterguerrilla units, having them reduce the number and intensity of patrols and remain
near their garrisons. The cutback in activity meant much lower levels of interaction between
the military and the populace and had the positive effect of lowering the number of civilian
deaths, which dropped from 1,721 in 1984 to under 500 in 1985. 20 Additionally, the number
of disappearances dropped from an average of 880 per year during 1983 and 1984 to 205.
The lowered activity also meant fewer restrictions on civil rights and more freedom of
movement for villagers – and resulted in increased Sendero activity.
In December, rebels conducted a series of dynamite attacks in Lima to mark
Guzmán’s 51st birthday. The insurgents attacked the house of the founder of APRA, as well
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as ten banks, a shopping center, eight electrical towers, a judicial office, and other sites
causing minimal damage and no injuries. 21 Just a few months later, in May 1986, a Sendero
squad assassinated a Peruvian rear admiral in Lima, the highest ranking officer killed to date
and the exclamation point on an increasing level of activity. 22
By mid-year, Sendero was once again executing strikes across Peru and appeared to be
preparing for a major event. This occurred in June when rioting Senderista inmates took over
Lurigancho, Santa Barbara, and El Fronton prisons. Immediately after learning of the
incident, President Garcia ordered the military to reestablish control of the prisons. After a
short standoff, security forces raided all three prisons and restored order, but killed over 240
inmates, including all the prisoners at Lurigancho prison, who reportedly surrendered prior to
the raid. 23
President Garcia was shocked at the casualties his police and military forces had
inflicted and quickly ordered investigations by both Congress and his attorney general.
Tensions again rose considerably among the military leaders over a feared purge. Within a
week of the massacres the initial investigation revealed that the Republican Guard police
force was behind the raid at Lurigancho prison. Garcia announced that fifteen police officers
and eighty policemen would stand trial, while commending the actions of the army.
Additionally, the investigation revealed that the military executed the raids at the other two
prisons, but with only a few casualties at Santa Barbara and only thirty-five at El Fronton.
The military thus appeared to be absolved of wrongdoing, but many politicians criticized the
findings and the government’s investigation.
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Garcia again demonstrated political maneuvering by voicing concerns publicly, while
making private agreements. By June 28, the chief executive was publicly lashing out at the
police forces and military over human rights abuses. He later met privately with top military
leaders for several hours however, and appeared to calm the situation. Minister of Justice
Gonzales Posada resigned over the incident, fearful because of terrorist threats against his
family. 24 The president later announced during a press conference that the military had acted
appropriately during the raids and the incident had a positive aspect because a great number of
terrorists had been eliminated. He also stated that Peruvians would have to learn to live with
heightened levels of violence. 25 Garcia later formed a national council on human rights to
provide oversight on human rights abuse cases and make recommendations on upholding
laws. Despite the prison incident he remained extremely popular with a 75 percent approval
rating. 26
The state then began an active period of initiatives to maintain high public opinion
while maintaining pressure on the insurgents. One of Garcia’s key steps was the
reorganization of the military and police in April 1987. The government created the Ministry
of Defense to oversee the three military services. 27 The new ministry consisted of the
combined chiefs of the armed forces and a National Defense Secretariat of retired generals.
For the police, the administration placed the three police divisions under a new organization,
the National Police, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. In the new organization,
the Civil Guard was renamed the General Police, the Republican Guard became the Security
Police and the Intelligence Police became the Technical Police. The government also created
24
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a new police intelligence unit called DINCOTE. Garcia pushed these reforms in order to
unify command of the police and military and further enhance civilian control of these
entities. Previously, each separate service and police division reported directly to the chief
executive. The reorganization reduced the span of control to the two ministries. President
Garcia also hoped the new unified commands would improve communication and
synchronization of the forces, while eliminating redundant tasks.
His new Justice Minister, Carlos Blancas, announced another administration initiative
in September. The plan called for Senderistas to lay down their arms and open negotiations
with the government. The arrangement also offered amnesty to any Senderista who turned
himself in and provided intelligence on the organization. The amnesty program proved to be
an effective intelligence-gathering tool. The call for talks, however, was rejected by Guzmán
and used as a propaganda point that Sendero Luminoso was winning the People’s War.
The Garcia administration also launched an ambitious development program in the
Emergency Zone, focusing on roads, schools, and health clinics. The number of projects
increased five-fold over the previous year. 28 The government also extended credit to peasants
at low rates and created short-term public employment projects. Naturally, this encouraged
the peasants in the highlands, many of whom never had seen any government support.
Additionally, the local military commanders ensured that their soldiers behaved better when
among the people. The commanders themselves communicated daily with the local leaders
and many of them spoke Quechua. These factors combined with the Senderista violence
against the local farmers, all contributed to increasing support for the government. Locals
even openly informed the military of Sendero activities. 29
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Garcia’s counterinsurgency efforts led to a sharp decline in Sendero activity in
early 1987. The government continued to pursue the Senderistas throughout the Emergency
Zone, which had shrunk to Ayacucho, Apurimac, and Huancavelica Departments. General
Jorge Sanchez Manrique commanded the forces in the Emergency Zone, which continued
active patrolling from the many counterguerrilla bases that dotted the countryside. The
general also increased support to the Rondas Campesinos, which were becoming an
increasingly effective tool. The few attacks Sendero carried out were outside the Emergency
Zone to the north in Junin Department or to the east in Cusco and Puno Departments.
Discovering that they had an opportunity outside the Emergency Zone, Sendero began
to pick up activity in these lightly patrolled areas. The insurgents also renewed attacks
against foreign businesses in Lima including the Bank of Tokyo and Chase Manhattan. 30 The
rebels also harassed development project workers and any military units that appeared
vulnerable. The Senderistas were careful to not become decisively engaged and appeared to
be testing the military in many areas looking for a weak point or perhaps disguising their true
intentions.
They found their target when in May, they launched a major attack against a police
station in the UHV near the town of Santa Lucia. Nearly 200 insurgents moving in three
columns converged on the isolated police post in an attack that lasted several hours. The
police called for help from a nearby military garrison, but no soldiers responded. Many of the
police fled, and the rebels killed all who fell into their hands. The Senderistas controlled the
town of Santa Lucia for over twenty-four hours until the Army moved into the area, and then
the insurgents withdrew. This event signaled a renewed burst of activity from Sendero,
mostly in the UHV, including bombings of a hydroelectric plant, mortar attacks, and
30
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assassinations. The insurgents often attacked the power grid which left areas of Peru without
power for days at a time and disrupted industrial activity. 31 One dramatic example was
Sendero’s attack on the Lima power grid on New Year’s Eve that blacked out the city for
several days. The strike was well timed to occur exactly at midnight.
The insurgents also intensified their intimidation against people who cooperated with
the government. No one was safe – rebels killed several civilians including a six year old
child in Cayumbo for providing assistance to the police in the area. 32 They killed twenty-six
peasants returning to their village from a government-sponsored fair near Ayacucho. The
insurgents also stabbed two civilians in a people’s trial in a village square for cooperating
with the government.
The new Sendero activity was costing the government millions of dollars. This, as
well as the increased spending on public works projects, heightened the already troubled
economic situation and forced President Garcia to take drastic measures. In June 1987, he
nationalized foreign banks in an effort to gain currency. This generated vehement protests
from abroad and the IMF cut-off funds to Peru. The end result was the start of a three year
economic slide. By the end of 1987 the economy started to suffer from hyperinflation. By
March 1988, inflation was climbing over 1,000 percent.33 This situation brought the
government public works projects to an abrupt halt and severely limited most support to the
peasants.
Sendero Luminoso capitalized on this weakened economic situation by increasing its
activity, moving once again into Phase II insurgency. With a new wave of attacks, the group
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was causing destruction throughout the country. The insurgents bombed nine businesses and
government offices in Huancayo on February 10. They burned the government offices
outside Tocache Nuevo only three days later.34 They also killed a judge and a local official
from Incaracay and continued to murder civilians who cooperated with the government. In
one incident in Ayacucho, they killed forty-six peasants who failed to provide support.
Although these assaults occurred all over south central Peru, the focus of the activity
was in the UHV. In February, the insurgents ambushed two army convoys, killing eighteen
soldiers and wounding sixteen more. They also attacked several police buses in May resulting
in seventeen dead and thirty-three wounded. Sendero also increased raids against local
mining companies in order to acquire more explosive material. At one point Sendero
stormed the government controlled mining company CENTROMIN near Cerro de Pasco three
times in less than ten days. 35
The group also began to demonstrate behavior proving it was a force on the rise and
seeking to generate additional support from abroad. On several occasions, the rebels became
emboldened enough to openly participate in legal political rallies. Additionally, several
Senderistas lectured at universities in neighboring countries. Sendero also joined a group
called the Revolutionary International Movement – a small European based international
organization of groups with Marxist, Leninist, Maoist ideologies. 36
The government did score one major success. On June 12, the police arrested the
group’s second in command, Osman Morote. 37 The arrest provided a needed boost to the
government and the public’s perception of the police. Besides being Guzmán’s chief
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lieutenant, Morote also served as the military commander of the Huancavelica zone, although
he recently moved into the UHV to reorganize forces in that critical area. Morote was a
member of the central committee and a key strategist of the People’s Guerrilla Army.
Although his capture generated much excitement, the compartmental nature of Sendero
prevented any major security breach
The government was unable to capitalize on this key arrest as Morote was acquitted of
the charges brought against him only a month later. The acquittal enraged the public and
most people suspected the judges had been bought off or intimidated into the acquittal. Many
criminal judges admitted that they feared for their lives and those of their families when
dealing with Sendero cases. Garcia promised the public that Morote would not go free and
the government presented additional charges against him. The president also pledged to
present new anti-terror laws to congress within the year. 38 Only days later, a vigilante group
calling itself the Rodrigo Franco Democratic Command killed Morote’s attorney. Sendero
claimed the group was sponsored by the government and vowed revenge.
The insurgents continued to gain strength as the nation moved toward national
elections in 1989. The rebels killed almost indiscriminately, targeting any group or individual
that wasn’t Sendero. The scale of the attacks seemed to be increasing, especially against the
civilians. In particular, the violence between Sendero and the Rondas Campesinos escalated
in villages across Peru. In one incident, Sendero killed 39 peasants in Ayacucho as the
peasants prepared for a patrol. Many of the Rondas scored successful hits on Sendero as well.
Equally serious as the Sendero threat, the economic problems were quickly reaching
disaster status. Inflation rose to nearly 7,500 percent. 39 Support for President Garcia’s party
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(APRA) eroded. The chief executive’s economic policies proved disastrous and drove
millions to the illegal economy. The only real wages that could be earned were in coca
production and Sendero secured most of the coca production in the UHV. The group also
continued to gain funds through extortion from companies and bank robberies.
In a final effort to help Peru’s collapsing economy, Garcia pledged to cooperate with
the United States counter-narcotics effort, which brought in an influx of aid dollars. Starting
at the end of 1989, he also allowed U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams into Peru to
assist and advise the Peruvian military in counterinsurgency operations. At least three teams
conducted training in base defense and interdiction techniques. In February 1990, The United
States and Peru signed an exchange of notes on extradition of drug traffickers, a major victory
for the United States in the War on Drugs. 40 The exchange confirmed explicitly that persons
charged with narcotics trafficking and related drug offenses were subject to extradition to the
United States for trial.
Despite the stronger ties, President Garcia could not overcome the economic problems
and Sendero threat. A relatively unknown political outsider and former mathematician,
Alberto Fujimori, won the national election, perhaps because he was an outsider. The people
were certainly ready for a change. The past two administrations had failed to deliver on their
promises. The economy was worse than ever. The insurgency was growing and seemed
stronger than at any time since 1982. The people were willing to do almost anything to
reverse the negative trends in Peru.
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CHAPTER 5 FUJIMORI COUNTERINSURGENCY (1990-2000)
As Fujimori took office, Sendero Luminoso numbered close to 25,000 militants and
controlled about one-fourth of all municipalities, but more significantly, it undermined the moral,
social, and political order of Peru. 1 The new president had developed a comprehensive
counterinsurgency strategy to defeat Sendero, but the insurgency was not his only concern. The
president also inherited an economy suffering from hyperinflation and cut-off from international
aid, as well as a restive population looking to the government to improve their lives. The chief
executive introduced “Fujishock”, a series of austerity measures designed to bring the economy
under control and return foreign aid and investment. In addition, he was now responsible for a
government and military facing numerous charges of corruption. Fujimori purged the military
leadership in order to place loyalists in position to carry out his programs. The president focused
on economic and government issues to strengthen his position, even at the expense of allowing
Sendero to grow, before launching his counterinsurgency. Eventually, he assumed absolute
control of the country in a self-coup in order to push through his anti-terror initiatives. Although
many decried his actions, Fujimori was able to capture Guzman and all but destroy Sendero
Luminoso; by the end of the 1990’s only a handful of rebels remained.

The chief executive had learned from watching previous administrations that he had to gain
firm control over the military. He had observed how the Belaúnde administration operated in
fear of the military and the Garcia administration lost control of it and faced continual human
rights scandals. Fujimori wanted the military to answer to him and him alone. In order to direct
the military, the president turned to his most trusted advisor Vladimiro Montesinos. Montesinos
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suggested which generals the commander in chief should retire, which ones to promote, and
which to place in key posts. 2 Together they developed a plan to purge the armed forces of
possible opponents and lay the basis for tighter control of the high command.
Almost immediately after taking office, Fujimori relieved the commander of the Navy and
his intelligence chief for actively opposing his candidacy during the presidential campaign. He
also replaced the top two Air Force commanders, who had a history of working against each
other in order to gain power, with loyalist officers. Fujimori promulgated Decree Law No. 752 in
November 1991 which allowed him to appoint the military commanders from among the seniorranking generals and allowed the appointed officers to remain at their posts indefinitely. 3
Previously, the senior-ranking general had assumed the command of the armed forces when the
previous general retired and officers serving in other senior leadership positions served only for
one year before rotating out. Armed with his new legislation, he made General Nicolas Hermoza
Rios, another loyalists officer recommended by Montesinos, the Army commander. He then
placed the Ministries of Defense and Interior under the SIN. This move effectively placed
Vladimiro Montesinos as the director of intelligence, the national police, and the military. With
Hermoza now in place indefinitely, the president began appointing other reliable officers to key
positions and further reorganizing the military. With all the military service commanders
personally appointed by Fujimori, he had co-opted the military leadership and established firm
control.
To improve Peru’s economy, the president launched immediate austerity programs and began
repayment of debts in coordination with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Both
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measures brought instant international approval and increased aid. Foreign investors now
viewed Peru as a more stable and favorable environment for investment. By December 1990,
Fujimori was making progress with the economic situation in Peru. His administration’s
adherence to IMF measures dropped inflation from 400 to 10 percent. However, the austerity
measures were also sparking labor unrest which bolstered Sendero’s ability to recruit in Lima.
The administration increased cooperation with the United States in the areas of counternarcotics and intelligence-gathering. One of the most notable examples was the involvement of
the CIA with the counter-terrorism intelligence agency of the Peruvian National Police,
DINCOTE, Benedicto Jiminez of DINCOTE approached his superiors and the CIA agents about
forming his own special cell to track down Sendero leaders. Jiminez was appalled by standard
DINCOTE techniques which involved torture and other abuses of power, and wanted to follow
more traditional investigative techniques. His leaders were skeptical, but approved his proposal
and gave him a small budget and four agents. The CIA station chief in Lima took a wait-and-see
approach out of concern about becoming involved in another human rights scandal. 4 In June
1990 Jiminez’ group raided a major Sendero safe house in Lima, capturing several mid-level
leaders. As a result of the successful raid, the CIA provided additional assistance to this group,
including video equipment to use on stakeouts.
With this added help, Jiminez and his cell in March captured key Sendero Luminoso
documents and videos in Lima, proving that Sendero leader Abimael Guzmán was still alive.
Using techniques learned from the American agents, Jiminez also identified the Sendero logistics
and financial chief for Lima and began tailing him. After weeks of painstaking observation this
operative led them to other Sendero cadres. As a result of Jiminez’ success, the CIA also
established a training program at DINCOTE headquarters. Although the DINCOTE operators
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were effective in gathering information, they did not have the technology and skills to develop
the information into actionable intelligence and exploit it. The CIA focused its training program
on developing exploitable intelligence information and began training the Peruvian detectives
how to analyze, cross-reference, and classify documents. The CIA mentors, along with an expert
from Scotland Yard, also taught the Peruvians better surveillance techniques. The CIA provided
high-powered optics, telephoto cameras, listening devices, night vision goggles and vehicles, as
well as money for general operating expenses. By July, Jiminez’ group had expanded to about
eighty-two personnel. 5
The Drug Enforcement Agency also intensified its cooperation with Peru, assisting the
Peruvian Air Force to interdict drug flights into Colombia. Many in Peru resented the pressure
the U.S. placed on Latin American countries, including Peru, over the counter-narcotics effort.
The U.S. tied much of its aid to counter-narcotics performance measures. Many also criticized
the fact that crop-eradication efforts did not provide replacement crops to help peasants earn
income. The Peruvian military refused to participate in counter-narcotics operations because of
the many demands by the U.S. Even President Fujimori worked toward trying to remove
performance conditions from economic and military aid with U.S. 6
In response to increased foreign presence, Sendero Luminoso stepped up its violence against
foreigners. In August 1990, for example, it attacked and killed two Mormon missionaries near
Huancayo. A handwritten note left near the bodies demanded that all “Yankee invaders” leave
Peru. It also detonated several car bombs the same week in Lima, including one that targeted the
Mexican embassy, and one near the presidential palace on August 13. 7 In October, Sendero
assassinated a prominent human rights activist and also detonated a bomb near the wall that
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surrounded the German embassy in Lima. 8 On December 10, Sendero killed seven Peruvian
residents and destroyed all the equipment and facilities at an exploration camp of Mobil Oil at
Barranco in the UHV. It also detonated four explosive devices in Lima aimed at the Soviet,
Japanese, and American Embassies. 9
By the start of 1991, Sendero was a major force in Peru, operating with increasing freedom
of movement and effectively attacking targets at will. Although Sendero continued to avoid
large-scale firefights with military units, it attacked smaller military forces and outposts and most
police units. By most criteria, Sendero Luminoso was a Phase III Insurgency. It posed such a
threat that senior officials in the George H. W. Bush administration feared that it might be able to
seize power. Bernard Aronson, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, was
especially alarmed, comparing Sendero Luminoso to the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia. 10 He was
one of the primary proponents of increased CIA assistance to Peru.
By August, Sendero Luminoso’s continuing campaign against foreigners was having an
effect. The group appeared to specifically attack Japanese targets, possibly because of
Fujimori’s Japanese descent. In mid-July, Sendero killed three Japanese aid workers near Huaral
and a Peruvian-Japanese businessman in Lima. Japan withdrew all of its aid workers from Peru
in response. Sendero also attacked and killed a Canadian aid worker and an Australian nun.
The Fujimori administration seemed powerless to prevent the attacks. The president advised
foreigners residing in rural Peru to evacuate areas of guerrilla activities and move to urban
centers, such as Lima. 11 Although this act undoubtedly saved the lives of more aid workers, it
also prevented the people who needed aid from receiving it and confirmed their feeling that the
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government did not care for them. It also emboldened the insurgents and increased their belief
that if they caused enough death and damage, the government and its supporters would withdraw
or quit.
As always, several reports appeared charging the government with corruption and abuse.
The first charge to be raised against the Fujimori administration occurred in December 1990
when counter-narcotics police made allegations against the army concerning narcotics
corruption. The army, in turn, denied the police access to the UHV, which hindered their efforts.
The charges specifically named General Oswaldo Hanke, commander of the UHV military
region.
In another incident in November 1991, the media accused the army of killing five human
rights and legal workers in the central Sierra. This, once again, placed the military at odds with
the president and his campaign promise to protect civil liberties. Human rights groups claimed
that nearly 111 workers ‘disappeared’ in 1991 and blamed the army for most of the
disappearances. 12 In the media, Fujimori pledged to prosecute any offenses, but just as Belaúnde
and Garcia had been forced to do, in private he had to negotiate with military leaders out of the
fear of a possible coup.
Antiterrorist death squads also reappeared at the end of 1991. These groups carried out
several attacks against persons with suspected ties to Sendero or involved with prosecuting
human rights abusers in the military. Most indications pointed to the Rodrigo Franco Command,
a vigilante group that had close ties to the police during the Garcia administration. The group
was also suspected of committing two notable attacks in Lima. One, a raid on a party in the slum
of Barrios Altos, resulted in seventeen deaths, the other fourteen in a small village outside of
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Lima. What was notable was that in both attacks, nearby police stations failed to respond and
then conducted unhurried investigations that opened them to charges of collusion. 13
Despite these problems, by early 1992, Fujimori was satisfied that he had established
firm control of the government. The Peruvian economy was much improved and despite
Sendero activities, foreign investment was returning. The improvement of relations with the
United States had brought a resumption of American aid. He was solidly in control of the
military and enjoyed more domestic control than any chief executive since before the Velasco
coup in 1968. He could now turn his full attention to destroying the insurgent threat.
In contrast to Belaúnde and Garcia, Fujimori actually developed a national strategy to
defeat the insurgency. The centerpiece of this strategy was a series of laws designed to bolster
the military’s control of the areas designated as emergency zones. These laws also increased
judicial powers over accused terrorists. These measures included allowing suspected terrorists to
be held for up to 15 days without being charged and allowed judges to remain anonymous when
presiding over terrorism cases. Many international human rights groups complained about the
new measures and this international pressure influenced the congress as it debated the proposed
legislation.
Fujimori became impatient when the congress failed to approve or weakened many of his
initiatives. He also believed the judicial system was weak and corrupt. Over the course of his
presidency thus far, the courts had released nearly two hundred suspected rebels. 14 Additionally,
Fujimori had pressed the judicial branch to try Sendero Luminoso leader Abimael Guzmán in
absentia. This move drew criticism from many within and outside the government, including the
rival APRA representatives such as former President Alan Garcia. Despite common knowledge
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in Peru of Guzmán’s role in Sendero, he was exonerated by the Supreme Court for lack of
evidence.
Fujimori reached the limit of his patience on April 6. He ordered the military to deploy
throughout Lima to prevent possible unrest, dissolved congress, disbanded the judiciary, and
suspended the constitution, declaring a “national reconstruction” government. 15 He also placed
congressional leaders and former president Garcia under arrest on charges of corruption.
Leaders from the armed forces and national police all issued statements in support of the
president, which effectively prevented any significant protests. The people of Peru stayed at
home; most did not trust congress either so there was little protest. Fujimori could now press on
with his sweeping changes to fight the insurgency and with his economic recovery program. He
issued a statement that his cabinet would draft new laws and eventually hold a plebiscite on a
new constitution. For the time being, democracy was finished as Peru became the first South
American country of the 1990’s to slip back into authoritarianism. Many believed that civil
rights were now on hold and human rights violations would rise. 16
The effect of President Fujimori’s power grab or auto-golpe as it was called in Peru, was
to concentrate power in a triumvirate consisting of the President, Security Advisor Vladimiro
Montesinos, and the Chairman of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, General Nicolas
Hermoza Rios. The military now controlled all security matters in Peru, which greatly increased
the potential for abuse of power. Naturally, with this sort of power structure there was little if
any accountability or oversight of the military or intelligence network. Methods no longer
mattered, only results did.
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The leaders developed a two-pronged strategy to defeat the insurgency – one was a
severe curtailment of freedom of movement and suspension of many civil rights, the other was to
bolster the anti-Sendero mobilization of the people by civil patrols, the rondas campesinos first
introduced by the Belaúnde administration. In order to generate support, Fujimori tied
government benefits for villages and departments to rondas activity and also provided the rondas
with more modern arms and training. As a result, by 1993 there were more than 4,000 rondas
throughout Peru actively working to defeat Sendero Luminoso.
In response to the auto-golpe, the United States cut off military and economic assistance,
but, covert aid apparently continued, including CIA funds for the intelligence cell within
DINCOTE that was still searching for Sendero leaders. In June, the group arrested the Sendero
logistics and financial chief. Jiminez interrogated the individual and learned of several possible
safe houses in Lima that Guzmán could be using. Jiminez and his group established surveillance
on them and carefully searched the trash carried out by the residents. The searches from one of
the houses turned up many items that indicated Guzmán’s presence, including psoriasis
medicine, Absolut vodka bottles, and empty cartons of Winston Lights cigarettes. On September
14, Jiminez ordered a raid of the house which resulted in the capture of the elusive Sendero
Luminoso chief. 17
This particular moment was a critical time for the intelligence services, the police, and
the government of Peru. Up to this time, many of Sendero’s leaders had been killed during their
capture, either as a result of firefights with the military or while trying to escape. Many believed
that they had been murdered during the course of interrogations or simply executed at the time of
capture. Some intelligence officers reported Montesinos wanted Guzmán to meet the same fate.
As a matter of fact, Montesinos personally had placed General Antonio Ketin Vidal as the head
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of DINCOTE so Vidal could send him progress reports on the search for Guzmán. Officers
testified that he also wanted the general to have forces in place to kill the Sendero leader if he
was captured. But when Guzmán was arrested, Vidal did not follow Montesinos’ plan and
instead paraded Guzmán in front of the media for all of Peru to see. Montesinos reportedly was
furious. 18
Guzmán’s capture was the turning point in the fight against Sendero Luminoso. Guzmán
was more than the head of the group; he was the spiritual bond that held the movement together.
With his arrest, Sendero lost the guidance of “Gonzalo Thought,” those principles set forth by
Guzmán. The group could no longer claim to be the 4th sword of communism. Naturally,
Guzmán had deputies and a politburo, but Guzmán was Sendero, just as Osama bin Laden is Al
Qaeda. He had killed or discredited any who had grown too strong and the cronies who
remained were left in charge and forced to take the group into the future. Due to Sendero’s
compartmentalized structure, many of these subordinate leaders did not even know each other.
Undoubtedly, Guzmán’s fall left Sendero with a great power vacuum and severely limited. Peru
braced for Sendero’s response, expecting an onslaught of activity. Although the leader was
gone, the individual cells did not need to be told to strike. 19
President Fujimori’s approval rating increased from 56 to 73 percent after Guzmán’s
capture and this increased his ability to manipulate the constituent congress and the judiciary. 20
He continued to use decree power to reform the judiciary and transferred jurisdiction of terrorism
cases from civilian courts to military tribunals. In doing so, he stated the need to respect the
“popular will” of the people in handing down sentences to convicted terrorists. This change also
quickened the process of terrorism trials and all but guaranteed conviction and life sentencing.
18
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He followed these decrees by promising Guzmán a fair trial and a harsh sentence that would be
handed down by October 7. Two of Guzmán’s subordinates were convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment days earlier. 21
By September 1993, Sendero was on the verge of collapse. The group had taken nearly
twelve years to reach its zenith, but after Guzmán’s arrest, only one year to fall apart. It had not
conducted any major attacks in almost a year and had experienced a series of high-level
leadership arrests. Then, in a surprise move, Guzmán issued several letters from prison in which
the government claimed he called on his followers to lay down their arms and engage in peace
talks with the authorities. On 24 September, after nearly a year in captivity, Guzmán issued a
statement that was known as the ‘speech from the cage.’ 22 Guzman stated:
….[W]e are living historic moments, each of us must be clear that
this is the case, let us not fool ourselves. In these moments we should
mobilize all forces to confront difficulties and continue accomplishing our
tasks and conquering our goals, successes and victory! That is what we
must do. We are here as children of the people and we are struggling in
these trenches, it is also about combat, and we do it because we are
Communists, because here we defend the interests of the people, the
principles of the party, the People's War. That is why we do it, we are
doing it and will continue to do it! We are here in these circumstances.
Some think this is a great defeat. They are dreaming and we tell them to
keep on dreaming! It is simply a bend, nothing more, a bend in the road.
The road is long and we shall arrive. We shall triumph. You shall see it.
You shall see it….. [T]his is the situation, this is where they have brought
us. But we have a fact, a Peruvian revolution, a people's war, and it is, and
will continue to advance. 23
The government claimed Guzmán was calling for Sendero to lay down their arms and to
seek peace. There were even some within Sendero who felt this way. Many of the insurgents
were weary after over thirteen years of armed struggle. Fujimori claimed that Guzmán had
called for negotiations “to reach a peace accord to put an end to thirteen years of People’s
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War.” 24 Given the text of the speech, this is a dubious interpretation and was most likely made
as part of the government’s propaganda campaign. Guzmán’s message actually encouraged the
insurgents to continue the fight. The government propaganda created to a rift within Sendero,
with some saying the difficulties were too great to continue and calling for a “fight for a peace
accord.” 25 The hardcore insurgents refuted this position and continued fighting. Sendero now
found itself back to a Phase I insurgency limited to random terrorist attacks. In October,
militants detonated a car bomb in the parking lot near the departure terminal at Lima’s
international airport, injuring twenty persons and damaging the Americans Airlines cargo office.
The next month, Sendero tossed a satchel charge in front of the U.S.-Peruvian Binational Center.
One of the surprising losers of the Guzmán capture was the cell within DINCOTE headed
by Jiminez. Despite the success of the mission and the popularity of the group, Montesinos
successfully dismantled the group that had captured Guzmán. The leader of DINCOTE, Vidal,
was promoted to the National Police, but, in reality, his new position had much less authority.
Jiminez was shunted off to the Peruvian embassy in Panama as a police attaché. Montesinos’
moves caused a debate within the CIA about whether to continue to provide assistance to Peru
and with whom to coordinate. CIA authorities did not want to deal with Montesinos because of
his suspected ties to death squads, but many did not believe he was involved. Eventually, the
leaders concluded that Sendero had been defeated and that the agency should now focus on the
war on drugs and that Montesinos was useful for that purpose. 26
To maintain momentum, in 1994, the Fujimori administration announced a new amnesty
program to insurgents. Any insurgents who turned themselves in and cooperated with the
government would not face charges in military courts. This initiative contributed to the drop in
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violence in 1994. Sendero killed only 150 persons, down from 516 in 1993. The only incidents
of note were a car bomb at Air Force Headquarters in February that killed two and a sabotage of
several electrical towers in October, cutting off power temporarily in nearly all of Lima.
Sendero struggled to survive. The group had to recruit new members, rebuild and resolve its
leadership problems. Additionally, Sendero discovered that a coca plant fungus and a more
aggressive government counter-narcotics policy had disrupted its financial support system in the
UHV.
The decline continued in 1995. What activity Sendero did generate was limited to
isolated rural areas, mainly in the UHV as the group labored to maintain its financial network
and to rebuild. The police arrested many Senderistas prior to the national elections, preventing
any attempt to disrupt the vote. In a major coordinated operation, counterterrorist police arrested
approximately twenty members of Sendero Luminoso in the cities of Lima, Callao, Huancayo,
and Arequipa. Among those captured was the number two leader and central committee member
Margi Clavo Peralta, who later publicly announced her support for peace talks with the
government. 27
But the authorities suffered setbacks in the campaign against Sendero Luminoso. In
October a Sendero patrol attacked several army patrols near Aspuzana, killing fifteen soldiers.
Many of the people in the nearby villages welcomed the Senderistas, but it is unclear whether
their welcome was genuine or based on fear or convenience. As a result of this and other attacks
in the area, President Fujimori declared a state of emergency once again in the UHV. 28
Sendero once again reached out for meaningful external support, but the effort was in
vain. There were displays of sympathy, but little else. In March, the London-based
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Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) issued a call to “Rally to the Defense of our Red
Flag Flying in Peru!” RIM also stated its opposition to the call for a peace accord which would
have “represented a compromise of the fundamental interests of the people and an abandonment
of the People’s War and the revolutionary road.” 29 This interest from abroad most likely came
about by the influence of Senderistas who had fled to other countries. Several groups
sympathetic to Sendero Luminoso formed in various countries, during the course of the
“People’s War,” including the United States.
Despite the call for help, Sendero and the insurgency were all but finished. Peru entered
a period of relative calm and the Fujimori administration was riding a wave of popularity and
prosperity (in Peruvian terms). The only news involving Sendero Luminoso anymore was the
occasional arrest of a Sendero leader, such as that of senior Sendero leader Elizabeth Cardenas,
aka Comrade Aurora, in December. 30 It appeared that President Fujimori could turn his focus
from military matters and the insurgency to domestic and economic issues.
Sendero disrupted this period of calm, when it made an unexpected attack across the
south central highlands. The insurgents attacked an army patrol in Santa Cruz, but were forced
to withdraw. Another group attacked the military base at Los Milagros, capturing and executing
the officers. More police surrendered after an attack in Huanuco. A column of one-hundred
Senderistas took over the city of San Miguel for twenty-four hours. The attacks shocked the
nation with their suddenness and ferocity. What frightened most experts were the insurgents’
sophisticated command and control and ability to synchronize the multiple attacks in multiple
areas.
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These rebels caught the military unprepared. Most of the counterinsurgency garrisons
had settled into a routine. They performed predictable patrols and were not really looking for
signs of a Sendero resurgence. The military spent most of November retraining and reestablishing their patrols. Highly trained and refocused, the army went into action in December,
when the combined forces of the Special Operations Division of the Army and the special
operations division of the National Police held at least four clashes with Sendero groups. As a
result of the new campaign, the security forces captured nearly fifteen rebels, among them four
political-military commanders. They also dismantled six Sendero popular committees in the
UHV. The security forces scored a key victory when they captured and destroyed a large
quantity of war material and explosives in the San Jose Crespo Castillo District. 31 The brief
Sendero resurgence was finished.
The security forces maintained the offensive into 1998. On April 20, the police captured
Pedro Domingo Quintero, the second-highest ranking Shining Path rebel, and Oscar Ramirez
Durand’s right-hand man at a restaurant in Lima. Quintero, a former teacher, had been the
Shining Path’s ideological leader since Guzmán’s arrest. With Durand, he mapped out the
Shining Path’s military strategy. Recently, he led Sendero’s recruitment campaigns, aimed at
local youth. President Fujimori claimed that Quintero’s capture was made possible due to a rare
film of a high-level Sendero meeting obtained by the police in 1991. The same film was used to
arrest Guzmán. Police interrogated Quintero which led to a raid on Lima shantytowns on April
24 and the arrest of a local Sendero field leader, Alberto Ramirez, together with the head of
operations, Maximo Anosa. 32 The police also captured Rodolfo Condori, the group’s explosive
expert as well as a large quantity of explosives.
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By August 1998, a rift between the top three leaders of Peru forced President Fujimori to
make a change in military leadership. He dismissed General Hermoza as chairman of the joint
command and appointed General Cesar Enrique Saucedo Sanchez, formerly the Interior Minister
and man who commanded the forces that raided the Japanese Embassy after a takeover by
terrorists. General Julio Salazar Monroe, who was the head of the SIN, took over as defense
minister. Prior to the announcement, Montesinos ordered troops and tanks to occupy key
positions in the capital in order to prevent a possible move by Hermoza to counter the dismissal.
Montesinos was the clear winner in this move because it allowed him to consolidate control over
the intelligence community and the military. General Salazar was a noted Montesinos crony and
willing to relinquish authority to Montesinos, as he did as head of SIN.
Despite the shake-up, the military and police continued to score successes. In July 1999,
the military captured Durand after a two week sweep into Peru’s central jungle which included
fighter jets, helicopters, and both ground and river troops. 33 The combined force of military and
police pinned him down to a remote area where the Amazon jungle merges with the Eastern
slopes of the Andes. President Fujimori traveled to Jauja to personally oversee the manhunt. As
a result of the arrest, and Sendero’s loss of another leader, the insurgents did not conduct any
major attacks for the remainder of 1999. However, clashes continued in the central and southern
regions with soldiers pursuing two columns of 60-80 rebels, led by Comrade Alipio. 34
By 2000, the main effort against Sendero Luminoso was in the courts. Several Sendero
leaders were convicted and received sentences of thirty years to life in prison. The military
continued to round up remaining Sendero leaders, focusing on the UHV and Apurimac/Ene
River Valley where the remnants of the insurgency remained. Much of the successes resulted
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from increased U.S anti-terrorism training and aid to the Peruvian forces. By the end of the year,
Sendero strength was estimated to be down to 100-200 militants. 35 Additionally, Peru was
cooperating fully with U.S. law enforcement including sharing intelligence and sharing access to
databases.
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION
Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path was one of the most successful insurgent groups in
the western hemisphere. The group gained control of substantial portions of Peru through its
violent insurgency. It formed in the Andean highlands as a result of the dismal socioeconomic
conditions, which created the prerequisites for an insurgency to develop: (1) a vulnerable
population hoping for change, (2) leaders available to direct the insurgency and (3) lack of
government control.
The peasants of the Andean highlands lived for centuries in poverty. Yet they never
revolted against the government. These people accepted their way of life and simply went about
their business to survive. They were all but ignored by successive governments of Peru. Yet the
Velasco coup in 1968 and the subsequent agrarian reform put the first glimmer of hope in their
mind. The government promised to address their needs and when the government failed to
deliver, the peasants became susceptible to Sendero influence.
Of course, Abimael Guzmán Reynoso provided the needed leadership to propel Sendero
Luminoso into action. Guzmán had a vision of a self-sufficient utopian society for Peru and
believed that only he could lead Peru to that goal and only through the People’s War could it get
there. Guzmán’s vision turned a group of students and peasants into one of the most lethal
terrorist organizations in the world. He was able to motivate this group to give up what little
they had, to live voluntarily in harsh conditions, in some cases to learn a new language - all to
create a bond with the people he claimed to want to help. Guzmán provided direction to
Sendero, personally leading the group from a band of untrained vandals carrying sling shots to a
well-trained efficient guerrilla force. Equally significant was the fact that, once Guzmán was
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captured, Sendero rapidly declined to an almost insignificant force. Guzmán’s leadership was
Sendero Luminoso and without him Sendero Luminoso no longer existed.
Except for the short-lived attempt at agrarian reform in the early 1970’s by the Velasco
regime, the government ignored the Sierra until Sendero Luminoso started its terror campaign in
1980. The peasants never showed signs of organizing against the government and because of the
isolation provided by geography, it was easy for the government to disregard the region. This
lack of control or presence provided Guzmán the freedom of maneuver he needed to organize
Sendero Luminoso. He was able to transform the National University of San Cristobal of
Huamanga into an insurgency incubator that created rebel leaders instead of educated peasants
ready to use their knowledge to better their communities. The cadres were able to move about
the area freely, openly recruiting new members.
The peasants of the Andean highlands today still desire change, but recognize that the
government is trying to provide the change. Successive administrations attempted to address the
needs of the peasants with varying results. The government simply did not have the resources to
address all the needs in a timely manner. Yet after a quarter of a century of effort, progress has
been made. Conditions still provide the potential for mobilization against the government, but
not to the extent that existed prior to 1980.
Leaders like Abimael Guzmán do not come along very often. He was a rare force that
could impose his will on a mass of people to make them do things that, when examined from the
outside, seem strange or illogical. Does the next Guzmán exist now in the Andean highlands? It
is highly doubtful, but that is a question that can only be answered if Sendero re-emerges to pose
a serious threat to the government once again.
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The government established and maintained a continuous presence in the Sierra as a
result of the Sendero rebellion. This presence remains today. Although the State may not be
able to provide immediate change to the peasants, it maintains contact with them to show
concern for their needs. The police force, once one of the worst in Latin America, is now
functional. The military greatly improved its human rights record and many aid organizations
operate throughout Peru. The government maintains control throughout Peru.
Therefore, the prerequisites of an insurgency do not exist as they did prior to 1980. The
administration is addressing the population’s needs. The government maintains contact with the
people. The military treats the people better. The people see their lives slowly improving. The
only unknown variable is the leadership. Is the next Guzmán out there?
Besides improving the conditions that exist within Peru, the government conducted an
effective counterinsurgency campaign. Many may argue that point but the end state supports the
claim. The method the government used to win was brutal at times with random violence
committed against the people as well as the insurgents. But by restricting civil rights, targeting
the leadership, and conducting counterguerrilla operations, the government defeated Sendero
Luminoso. Counterinsurgencies by nature are lengthy campaigns. Failing counterinsurgencies
can drag out for decades and successful campaigns take many years because the insurgency is
never defeated until the conditions that created the insurgency are improved.
The speed that the insurgency collapses militarily increases with restrictions on civil
rights up to the maximum that the people will endure. These limitations take several forms such
as curfews, checkpoints, emergency zones, even the jurisdiction of trails. The people of Peru
endured all these and this hastened Sendero’s downfall. The government can increase these
control measures to speed up the collapse of an insurgency, but at some point the people will
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reach a ‘breaking point’ at which they reject the government and swing to the insurgency. This
breaking point is much higher in underdeveloped nations because the people are accustomed to
hardship and little freedom to begin with. For example, people in the United States complain
about minor air travel restrictions, whereas the Peruvians endured almost total restrictions on
movement, rights to assemble, rights to due process, and even rights to live where they wanted
and many more without complaint.
The second component of the government effort was to develop intelligence information
and target the leadership and cohesion of Sendero Luminoso, as demonstrated by the Fujimori
administration during the 1990’s. President Fujimori used Vladimiro Montesinos to create an
effective, imposing intelligence network throughout Peru. He also used his decree power to
remove restrictions on intelligence collection to allow the intelligence network to observe all
aspects of Peruvian life. This all-encompassing intelligence effort allowed the Fujimori
administration to locate and capture hundreds of Sendero leaders, including Abimael Guzmán.
The military and police also used torture and violence to gain information on Sendero leaders,
especially during the Belaúnde administration. It is safe to say that a large percentage of
captured Senderistas underwent torture during interrogation. Those harsh methods did produce
results, leading to the capture of other rebel leaders, but undoubtedly many innocent people were
wrongly persecuted. Additionally, the amnesty program offered by successive administrations
was an effective method of bringing in many Senderistas including the leaders. By the mid to
late 1990’s, many insurgents turned themselves in to avoid capture or death. These same
insurgents willingly provided information on other members and hastened the decline of Sendero
Luminoso.
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The military counterguerrilla campaign also contributed to Sendero’s defeat. The Dirty
War launched by the Belaúnde administration in 1982 was a violent, uncontrolled effort. The
military was not prepared to conduct small-unit actions in the highlands because they were
trained for a conventional war against Peru’s neighbors including Ecuador and Chile. It took the
military roughly three years to develop more effective counterguerrilla techniques to defeat
Sendero Luminoso tactically. One of the military’s most effective techniques was the
counterguerrilla bases it established near key towns and infrastructure. The units operating out
of these bases severely restricted Sendero’s ability to conduct attacks. The military also enjoyed
superior firepower over Sendero throughout the war. In addition to the counterguerrilla bases,
the military effectively used the local civil defense patrols or rondas campesinos. The rondas
campesinos provided security for some of the smaller villages and more importantly, provided
intelligence information on Sendero movements. The biggest benefit from the rondas was that it
involved the peasants in the counterinsurgency rather than in the insurgency.
Sendero Luminoso never achieved Guzmán’s goal of a general peasant uprising that
surrounded the cities and caused the government to fail. The insurgency achieved a Phase III
insurgency only a couple of times when large formations attacked and occupied territory in the
Upper Huallaga Valley. The rest of the time Sendero oscillated between Phase I and Phase II.
The majority of the peasants never shared Guzmán’s vision. They initially supported Sendero
Luminoso because Sendero provided services that the government never provided. When
Sendero stopped providing these services to the people, their support waned. The peasants
wanted benefits such as clean water, reliable electricity, and help to grow their crops, not the
People’s War.
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The lack of outside support also hampered Sendero. Most successful insurgencies
succeeded through some external support. Yet Sendero intentionally chose to reject this outside
help. Only after the movement was serious decline did its leaders begin to carry its message
abroad in a futile attempt to garner significant support.
Sendero Luminoso was associated with Mao Zedong because it attempted to create a
peasant uprising in Peru. But Sendero did not strictly adhere to Mao’s doctrine. He stated that in
order for guerrillas to be successful, the insurgency must have powerful political leaders who
“must work with the people.” 1 By working with the people, Sendero would have continued to
receive support. But Sendero did not work with the people once the government sent forces in
against it. From that point onward, Sendero focused on destroying anything not Sendero. The
group no longer assisted the peasants but coerced and threatened them and, as a result, their
support ceased. As Mao stated, the guerrillas derive their existence and support from the people
and must attempt to meet the needs of the people or the insurgency will fail. 2

1
2

Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, p. 1-2.
Ibid.

REFERENCES

Aquino, Marco and Jude Webber. “Fresh Scandal costs latest Peru spy chief his job.” 18 March
2004. <http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20040318161809990010> (22
March 2004).
Bauer, Richard. “Peru’s Great Disenchantment.” English Window. 11 March 2004.
<http://www.nzz.ch/english/background/2002/06/05_peru.html> (11 March 2004).
Benson, Drew. “Poll: Peruvian president his own enemy.” The New York Times. 12 February
2004. <http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2004/02/12/poll.htm>
(11 March 2004).
Berg, Ronald H. “Peasant Responses to Shining Path in Andahuaylas.” In David Scott Palmer,
ed. The Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp.83-104.
Bolivar, Albert. “The Return of Shining Path.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. 5 April 2002.
<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/latin.20020405.bolivar.returnofshiningpath.html> (1
November 2004).
Brooke, James. “An Ex-President of Peru Plots His Return.” The New York Times. 24 February
2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/international/americas/24FUJI.html> (24
February 2004).
Burt, Jo-Marie. “Shining Path and the “Decisive Battle” in Lima’s Barriadas: The Case of Villa
El Salvador.” In Steve J. Stern Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 19801995. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 267-306.
“Car Bomb Explodes Outside U.S. Embassy in Peru.” International Policy Institute for CounterTerrorism. 20 March 2002. <http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=754> (3 March
2004).
Chauvin, Lucien O. “New day in court for Shining Path insurgency in Peru.” The Miami Herald.
21 April 2003. <http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/5679370.htm> (22 November
2003).
Cotler, Julio. “Democracy and National Integration in Peru.” In Cynthia McClintock and
Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds., The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. 3-38.
Degregori, Carlos Iván. “The Origin and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views, Return to the Past.”
In David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992.
Pp. 33-44.

81

82
--------. “Harvesting Storms: Peasant Rondas and the Defeat of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho.”
In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 128-157.
De Wit, Ton and Vera Gianotten. “The Origin and Logic of Shining Path: Two Views, The
Center’s Multiple Failures.” In David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 45-57.
Eckstein, Susan, ed. Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001.
--------. “Power and Popular Protest in Latin America.” In Susan Eckstein, ed. Power and
Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2001. Pp. 1-60.
--------. “Where Have All the Movements Gone? Latin American Social Movements at the New
Millennium.” In Susan Eckstein, ed. Power and Popular Protest: Latin American
Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. 351-406.
Faiola, Anthony. “Montesinos Evades Capture By Peruvian Military Forces.” The Washington
Post. 18 September 2003.
--------. “Jailed U.S. Allies Show Seamy Side of Peru’s Drug War.” International Herald
Tribune. 11 May 2001. <http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01.n853.a06.html> (16
February 2004).
Falcoff, Mark. “Troubles at Midpassage for Peru’s Toledo.” Hispanic American Center for
Economic Research. <http://www.hacer.org/current/Peru004.php> (11 March 2004).
“Fatal Attraction: Peru’s Shining Path.” NACLA Report on the Americas. December 1990.
<http://www.nacla.org/art_display_printable.php?art=2276> (9 January 2004).
Forero, Juan. “Former Peru Spy Chief Stands Trail for Columbia Weapons Deal.” The New York
Times. 21 January 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/21/international/americas/
21COLO.html> (21 January 2004).
--------. “President of Peru is Dogged by Scandals as Calls to Resign Grow.” The New York
Times. 12 February 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/12/international/americas/
12PERU.html> (13 February 2004).
--------. “In Familiar Tactic, Peru’s President Will Shake Up His Cabinet.” The New York Times.
16 February 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/16/international/americas/
16PERU.html> (17 February 2004).

83
--------. “Peruvians Fight Graft One Case at a Time.” The New York Times. 5 April 2004.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/05/international/americas/05PERU.html> (6 April
2004).
Gerber, Louis. “Peru-the government of Alejandro Toledo.” 17 July 2001.
<http://www.cosmopolis.ch/english/cosmo17/toledo_peru.htm> (11 March 2004).
Gonzales, Jose E. “Guerrillas and Coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley.” In David Scott Palmer,
ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 105-125.
Gorriti, Gustavo. The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1999.
--------. “The Quota.” In Orin Starn, ed. The Peru Reader. Durham: Duke University Press,
1995. Pp. 316-327.
--------. “Shining Path’s Stalin and Trostky.” In David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 149-170.
Graham, Carol. “Government and Politics: Interest Groups – The Military.” In Rex A. Hudson,
ed. A Country Study: Peru. Library of Congress, 1992. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pe0126)> (31 October 2005).
Guzman, Abimael. “We are the Initiators.” In Orin Starn, ed. The Peru Reader. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995. Pp.310-315.
--------. “Speech from a Cage.” International Emergency Committee to Defend the Life of Dr.
Abimael Guzman, September 24, 1992. <http://www.csrp.org/speech.htm> (7 May
2006).
Hinojosa, Iván. “On Poor Relations and the Nouveau Riche: Shining Path and the Radical
Peruvian Left.” In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru,
1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 60-83.
Hoge, Warren. “Latin America Losing Hope in Democracy, Report Says.” The New York Times.
22 April 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/22/international/americas/22lata.html
> (27 April 2004).
Hudson, Rex A., ed. A Country Study: Peru. Library of Congress, 1992.
<http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/petoc.html> (31 October 2006).
Iglesias, Carlos Basombrio. “Sendero Luminoso and Human Rights: A Perverse Logic that
Captured the Country.” In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society
in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 425-446.

84
Isbell, Billie Jean. “Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho.” In David Scott
Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 59-81.
Izaguirre, Carlos Reyna. “Shining Path in the 21st Century: Actors in Search of a New Script.”
NACLA Report on the Americas. August 1996. <http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/
42a/016.html> (14 July 2002).
Johnson, Stephen. “Getting U.S.-Peru Relations Back on the Right Track.” The Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder. 13 August 2001. Pp. 1-8.
“Key Shining Path Member Arrested.” 5 October 2000.
<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=499> (17 December 2003).
Lane, Charles. “’Superman’ Meets Shining Path: Story of a CIA Success.” The Washington Post.
7 December 2000. <http://www.rose-hulman.edu/~delacova/peru/superman.htm> (22
November 2003).
Lalumiere, Frank. Cocaine: A Trans-National Issue. Fort McNair: National Defense University
1993.
Manrique, Nelson. “The War for the Central Sierra.” In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other
Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham, Duke University Press, 1998. Pp.
193-223.
Marks, Tom. “Making Revolution with Shining Path.” In David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path
of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 191-205.
Masterson, Daniel M. Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to
Sendero Luminoso. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Mauceri, Philip and Maxwell A. Cameron. “Unholy Alliance: Drugs, Corruption, and the
Peruvian Military During the Fujimori Administration.” Paper for the Canadian
Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies conference. 1 January 1998.
<http://idepe.org/articulos_cameron1a.htm> (11 March 2004)
McClintock, Cynthia and Abraham F. Lowenthal, eds. The Peruvian Experiement Reconsidered.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
McClintock, Cynthia. “Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru.” In David Scott Palmer,
ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 225-240.
--------. “Peru’s Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory.” In Susan Eckstein, ed.
Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001. Pp. 61-101.

85
--------. “Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso.” World Politics, Volume
37, Number 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. 48-84.
McCormick, Gordon H. The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism. Rand Corporation, 1987.
“Military Line.” <http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/docs_en/milline.htm> (21 February 2004).
“Montesinos: The CIA Hitman in Peru.” Revolutionary Worker. September 2000.
<http://www.csrp.org/rw/rw1072.htm> (4 March 2004).
‘Nicario.’ “Memories of a Cadre.” In Orin Starn, ed. The Peru Reader. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995. Pp. 328-335.
Obando, Enrique. “Civil-Military Relations in Peru, 1980-1996: How to Control and Coopt the
Military (and the consequences of doing so).” In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other
Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995, Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp.
385-410.
Ocasio, Heriberto. “Why the People’s War is Justified and Why it is the Road to Liberation.”
May 1995. <http://www.csrp.org/15year.htm> (15 December 2003).
Oliart, Patricia. “Alberto Fujimori: “The Man Peru Needed?” In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and
Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press,
1998. Pp. 411-424.
Palmer, David Scott, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1992.
--------. “National Security: Changing Constitutional Basis.” In Rex A. Hudson, ed. A Country
Study: Peru. Library of Congress, 1992. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cdstdy:@field(DOCID+pe0149)> (31 October 2006).
--------. “The Armed Forces: Mission and Organization.” In Rex A. Hudson, ed. A Country
Study: Peru. Library of Congress, 1992. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgibin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pe0152)> (31 October 2006).
--------. “Police Forces.” In Rex A. Hudson, ed. A Country Study: Peru. Library of Congress,
1992. <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+pe0159)> (15
November 2006).
“Peru and Privatization: Just Say No.” World Press Review. September 2003.
<http://www.worldpressorg./Americas/657.cfm> (11 March 2004).
“Peru captures Shining Path rebel leader.” CNN.com. 10 November 2003.
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/americas/11/09/peru.rebel.reut> (22 November
2003).

86
“Peru: Intelligence Advisor Gains as President Alberto Fujimori Fires Military Chief, Replaces
Ministers.” NotiSur – South American Political Affairs. 28 August 1998.
<http://ssdc.ucsd.edu/news/notisur/h98/notisur.19980828.html> (17 February 2004).
“Peru Leader Voices ‘Disappointment’ in Corruption Scandal.” The New York Times. 2 February
2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/international/americas/02PERU.html> (3
February 2004).
“Peru’s New President Inauguration at Machu Picchu.” 29 July 2001.
<http://www.labyrinthina.com/toledo.htm> (11 March 2004).
“Peru newspaper urges Toledo to cede power.” The New York Times. 12 February 2004.
<http://www.boston.com/news/world/latinamerica/articles/2004/02/12/peru_newspaper_
urges_toledo_to_cede_power.html> (11 March 2004).
“Peruvian Military will back Fujimori.” Corpus Christi Caller-Times. 22 September 2000.
“Peru President Tells AJC Luncheon: No Place For Ambiguity in Fight Against Terrorism.”
Charity Wire. 3 February 2002. <http://www.charitywire.com/charity11/02505.html> (11
March 2004).
“Peruvian Security Forces Capture Shining Path Leader.” 14 July 1999.
<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=289> (17 December 2003).
“President Bush Meets with President Toledo in Peru.” 23 March 2002.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020323-13.html> (11 March
2004).
“President shakes up Peruvian military.” Amarillo Globe-News. 15 August 2001.
<http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/081501/usn_peruvian.shtml> (11 February 2004).
Quispe, Luis, ed. “Peru: Reports in the press.” Peruvian Newsbriefs.
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1131/press_peru_guerrilla.html> (4 March 2004).
Rénique, José Luis. “Apogee and Crisis of a “Third Path”: Mariateguismo, “People’s War,” and
Counterinsurgency in Puno, 1987-1994.” In Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths:
War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 307340.
“Rioting forces President Toledo to cancel U.S. trip.” Peru to You. 19 June 2002.
<http://www.perutoyou.com/News%202002/news0619a.htm> (11 March 2004).
Rowen, Beth. “Alejandro Toledo: Man of the poor wins Peruvian presidency.” Infoplease.
<http://www.inforplease.com/spot/toledo1.html> (11 March 2004).

87
Ryan, Missy. “20,000 March to Challenge Peru’s Toledo.” Committee to Free Lori Berenson. 3
June 2003. <http://www.freelori.org/news/03jun03_reuters.html> (11 March 2004).
Saavedra, Boris. “Confronting Terrorism in Latin America: Latin America and United States
Policy Implications.” National Defense University. 30 October 2003.
<http://www.ndu.edu/chds/redes2003/Academic-Papers/1.Hemisphericsecurity/6.Security-Emerging-Threats/1.%20B.%20Saavedra-final.doc>
“Shining Path Leaders Captured.” 25 April 1998.
<http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=51> (17 December 2003).
Skidmore, Thomas E. and Peter H. Smith. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001.
Smith, Michael L. “Taking the High Ground: Shining Path and the Andes.” In David Scott
Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 15-32.
--------. “Shining Path’s Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte.” In David Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path
of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 127-147.
Starn, Orin, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk, ed. The Peru Reader. Durham: Duke
University Press, 1995.
Starn, Orin. “Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes.” In
Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1998. Pp. 224-260.
Stern, Steve J., ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham:
Duke University Press, 1998.
Stevenson, Sharon. “Peruvian security chief detained by military. Fujimori meets with advisers,
opposition mapping new election strategy.” CNN.com. 18 September 2000.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/09/18/peru.scandal.02/index.html> (4
March 2004).
Strong, Simon. Shining Path: The World’s Deadliest Revolutionary Force. London: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1992.
Tarazona-Sevillano, Gabriela. “The Organization of Shining Path.” In David Scott Palmer, ed.
Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 171-190.
United States Central Intelligence Agency. Plans of Chinese Communist Party to Call Meeting
of World Communist Leaders. 7 January 1963.
--------. Directorate of Intelligence. The Peruvian Coup: Reasons and Prospects. 12 February
1969.

88

--------. Peru and the United States: The Implications of the IPC Controversy. 6 March 1969.
--------. Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less Developed Countries 195470 and years 1969 and 1970. 3 March 1971.
--------. Latin America Review-Peru: Sendero Luminoso. 15 September 1982.
--------. Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship. 28 December 1982.
--------. Terrorism Review-Peru: Standoff With Sendero Luminoso. 20 September 1984.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1984. 4 October 1984.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1984. 15 November 1984.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1985. 25 March 1985.
--------. Terrorism Review-Peru: The Continuing Sendero Luminoso Challenge. 6 May 1985.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1985. 20 May 1985.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1985. 1 July 1985.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1985. 29 July 1985.
--------. Peru: Armed Forces Chief Dismissed. 18 September 1985.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1985. 13 January 1986.
--------. Latin America Brief. 6 May 1986.
--------. National Intelligence Daily. 28 June 1986.
--------. Peru: Human Rights Council Created: Attacks Reported. 9 September 1986.
--------. National Intelligence Daily. 8 November 1986.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1986. 13 January 1987.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1987. 9 April 1987.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1987. 16 July 1987.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1987. 22 October 1987.

89
--------. Terrorism Review-Latin American Terrorism in 1987. 11 February 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Peru: Sendero Luminoso’s Latin American Contacts. 10 March 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1988. 21 April 1988.
--------. National Intelligence Daily. 14 May 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1988. 2 June 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1988. 28 July 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Peru: Arrest of Sender Luminoso Leader. 8 September 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1988. 28 July 1988.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1989. 23 March 1989.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1989. 1 June 1989.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1989. 10 August 1989.
--------. National Intelligence Daily. 29 September 1989.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1989. 14 December 1989.
--------. OCPAS Latin America Brief. 10 February 1990.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1990. 22 March 1990.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1990. 23 August 1990.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1990. 6 September 1990.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1990. 1 November 1990.
--------. Herewith Support Cable for Latin America Brief OCPAS Lab. 1 December 1990.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1990. 10 January 1991.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1990. 21 March 1991.
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1991. 4 April 1991.
--------. National Intelligence Daily. 3 July 1991.

90
--------. Terrorism Review-Chronology of Terrorism-1991. 8 August 1991.
--------. Peru: Army Implicated in Human Rights Killings. 13 December 1991.
--------. Spot Commentary-Peru: President Mounts “Palace Coup.” 6 April 1992.
--------. Peru: A Hard Act to Follow. 14 September 1992.
--------. Peru: Fujimori Riding Higher. 14 September 1992.
--------. Latin America Brief. 5 October 1992.
--------. Latin America Brief. 14 November 1992.
--------. Latin America Brief. 25 November 1992.
--------. Peru: Implications of Failed Coup Bid. 11 December 1992.
--------. Latin America Brief. 8 January 1993.
--------. Latin America Brief. 20 February 1993.
--------. Security Threat in the Upper Huallaga Valley Peru. 14 May 1993.
--------. The World Factbook-Peru. 8 February 2004.
United States Department of the Army. Field Manual No. 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations.
United States Army Infantry School. 29 August 1986.
--------. Headquarters Southern Command. Biographic Sketch, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres. 5
August 1996.
United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency. Public Allegation of Drug
Trafficking Against the Head of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service (SIN)
Vladimiro Montesinos. 27 August 1996.
United States Department of State. FY-76 IV Nomination. 8 January 1976.
--------. Detention of Vladimiro Montesinos. 4 April 1977.
--------. Detention of Vladimiro Montesinos. 7 April 1977.
--------. Peruvian Terrorists Lose the Initiative. 24 February 1983.
--------. Peru’s President Belaunde Makes Surprise Visit to Emergency Zone. 14 June 1983.

91
--------. Mass Grave Discovered in Emergency Zone. 28 August 1984.
--------. Local District Attorneys Press Charges Against Marine Commander in Ayala
Disappearance and Evangelical Killing Cases. 26 February 1985.
--------. Reaction Within Army to Removal of Generals Jarama and Mori. 19 September 1985.
--------. Alleged Navy Involvement in Disappearance of Naval Officer. 6 March 1986.
--------. GOP Orders Investigations of Prison Deaths. 23 June 1986.
--------. Garcia Declares 95 Police Arrested for Summary Executions at Lurigancho Prison. 25
June 1986.
--------. Garcia and the Military: Plea for International Support. 28 June 1986.
--------. Current Crisis in Peru. 30 June 1986.
--------. President Garcia Says Crisis is Over. 1 July 1986.
--------. Alleged Massacre at Pomatambo and Parcco. 26 November 1986.
--------. Embassy Visit to Ayacucho and Parcco. 21 January 1987.
--------. Peru: Armed Forces Command Issues Communiqué on Killing. 21 April 1987.
--------. Army General Denies Providing Information on La Cantuta to Robles. 1 June 1993.
--------. 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 1994.
--------. 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 1995.
--------. 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 1996.
--------. 1996 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 1997.
--------. 1997 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 1998.
--------. 1998 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 1999.
--------. 1999 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 2000.
--------. 2000 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 2001.
--------. 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 2002.

92
--------. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2001. 4 March 2002.
--------. Consular Information Sheet-Peru. 13 January 2004.
“USAITAC Counterintelligence Periodic Summary 90-09.” 23 October 1990.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB37/01-01.htm> (21 February 2004).
“USAITAC Counterintelligence Periodic Summary 91-06.” 27 July 1991.
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB37/02-01.htm> (21 February 2004).
“USF Graduate Elected President of Peru: The First Indian American President of Peru Promises
Social Change.” USF Media Release. 5 June 2001.
<http://www.usfca.edu/media_relations/releases/toledo.html> (11 March 2004).
“Vladimiro Montesinos Torres.” Desaperecidos Gallery of Peruvian Torturers and Killers.
<http://www.desaparecidos.org/peru/tort/montesinos/eng.html> (4 March 2004)
“White House Fact Sheet on the Peru-United States Extradition Agreement.” George Bush
Presidential Library and Museum. 15 February 1990.
<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1990/90021503.html> (13 January 2004).
Woy-Hazleton, Sandra and William A. Hazleton. “Shining Path and the Marxist Left.” In David
Scott Palmer, ed. Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. Pp. 207224.
Zedong, Mao. On Guerrilla Warfare. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith II. Champaigne: University of
Illinois Press, 1961.

VITA
Russell W. Switzer, Jr. was raised in Boulder, Colorado. He graduated from Fairview
High School in 1981 and entered the United States Marine Corps Reserve as a field artilleryman.
He entered active duty when he joined the United States Army in 1986 as an infantryman. His
first assignment was to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he served as a scout and sniper
including being deployed to Panama in Operation Just Cause in 1989-1990. He then spent a year
learning Russian at the Defense Language Institute and served as a Signals Intelligence Analyst
in Germany. During his tour in Germany in 1993, he earned his Bachelor of Science and applied
for and was accepted to Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia receiving a
commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Infantry. He served at the National Training Center as
an Opposing Force platoon leader, executive officer, and scout platoon leader. He then moved to
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and commanded an airborne rifle company in the 325th Airborne
Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division. His next assignment was at the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, where he served as a platoon, company and battalion
level observer/controller. He also served with the Multinational Corps Headquarters – Iraq and
Multinational Force – Northwest during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His military schooling
includes the Infantry Basic and Advanced Courses, Command and General Staff College, Joint
Firepower Control Course, the Airborne, Jumpmaster and Pathfinder Schools and the Ranger
Course. He is married to the former Rae Currey of Bellingham, Washington, and together they
have seven children.

93

